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Lilov Views Domestic, Foreign Crises

93BA0363A Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 1 Dec 92 p 4

[Interview of Aleksandur Lilov, former leader of the BSP, by Karmelita Deneva; place and date not given: "Aleksandur Lilov Thinks the BSP Government Has No Chance"]

[Text] *The former party leader states that the party is tired of governing and that he expects a caretaker government.*

[Deneva] Mr. Lilov, those who take the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] consultations on forming a government seriously are in the minority, but since you are participating in some of the meetings, you must consider them a serious matter.

[Lilov] They do not go through the motions of negotiation, but rather the search for partners for finding a formula for a stable national government. What remains is to fill in the picture and see how it has turned out.

[Deneva] When will you fill it in?

[Lilov] No later than Monday or Tuesday, I think. By then it will become clear who is to be prime minister. I must explain that a large number of names are being discussed and bandied about. Some say six or seven, others 10, and still others 20 names. But insofar as I am concerned, this number should be reduced to a maximum of three by Tuesday.

[Deneva] What are your personal preferences for prime minister?

[Lilov] It is no secret that I would like to have Todor Vulchev continue to be the head of this government, but most regrettably he will not alter his decision not to participate in political life. There is another person, Khristo Danov, a man who has great prestige, one who instituted order and legality in the country at a difficult moment. I should like to cite the names of the leaders of the Alliance for Bulgaria, Messrs. Boyadzhiev and Sendov, or why not the rector of Sofia University, Professor Genchev? The university has given many prime ministers to Bulgaria.

[Deneva] And so you are an optimist who believes that Bulgaria will have a government in the next few days?

[Lilov] I have been in politics a long time and have a pragmatic view of things. I think that the prospect for forming such a government is small, but not zero. In all probability there will be no government based on the formula we propose, and almost certainly a caretaker government will be formed. But I repeat that this is a prediction that I would not like to see come true, because all possibilities have not been exhausted. One thing is certain: No one can accuse the BSP of trying to assume power again itself in this manner.

[Deneva] In other words, the entire week has been a bustling one devoted to pointless work?

[Lilov] No. In my opinion these consultations do represent progress, after our one-year interval with no political dialogue.

[Deneva] But even the president is expressing tentative doubts about the success of your consultations.

[Lilov] You tell him that; I have not talked to him. To a very great extent Mr. Zhelev is currently expressing the moderate tendency in the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], and so not within a scope broader than the SDS. I am relying on the president to resolve the government crisis.

[Deneva] But many persons believe that he is already considering a caretaker government.

[Lilov] It is possible that many persons are right. But that would surprise me, because he must realize that a government of national consensus, however difficult it might be to achieve, is much better than a caretaker government.

[Deneva] In this difficult situation, do you intend, if not to assist, at least not to stand in the way of the president?

[Lilov] A person in politics should not be vengeful. This is a bad if typical quality for Bulgarians and for weak politicians. You see how regular are these changes of regime, accompanied by slaughter of the political elite on our side. This is possibly a major tragedy of Bulgaria. We cannot allow ourselves to be resentful. When the president goes beyond partiality toward one party and one color and becomes a head of state, he can rely on the full support of the BSP. We want to support the head of state and a stable Presidency, which will play an important role.

[Deneva] Are you the originator of the concept of the government formula?

[Lilov] I would not define the situation in those terms. I support this idea and I am ready to defend it with arguments demonstrating that this is the path to follow in a period of crisis.

[Deneva] The OSD [Alliance for Social Democracy] complains that it has been virtually excluded from the negotiations concerning the government.

[Lilov] They have no reason to complain. There are institutionalized structures, that is, the party leadership and the leaders of the parliamentary group. Under what rules should they be replaced by persons who have the necessary qualifications but who have an exaggerated opinion of themselves?

[Deneva] You seem to have changed your attitude toward the OSD.

[Lilov] I believe that the OSD is going beyond the limits of an ideological current and is becoming something else, but at the moment I am unable to define it. They want to shape a policy of their own and a center of their own with top-to-bottom structures, something for which no provision is made in the statutes of the BSP. The objective of their activities appears to be to transform the OSD into a political partner of the other political forces, and this is something strange.

[Deneva] A BSP expert states that their defeat is imminent.

[Lilov] Well, I do not know who this expert is, but he is by no means an expert, because he is not familiar with the party, which is changing. One of the characteristics of a civilized state and a democratic disposition is the ability to accept differences of opinion. Our party accepts differences of opinion, and so the OSD has nothing to worry about.

[Deneva] But the persons currently in charge of the SDS are getting rid of any person exhibiting differences of opinion. Does this not make you uneasy?

[Lilov] Of course it makes me uneasy. The SDS, which should be the most keenly aware of the value of differences of opinion and a proponent of democracy, simply must acknowledge different ideas and different alternatives. But the process of differentiation is continuing in the SDS. In the future the SDS will probably become a part of a single current rather than of all trends in Bulgaria. In order to survive in political life, it must demonstrate to Bulgaria whose interests it is that it expresses and defends. They are avoiding this question, but they cannot keep on doing so.

[Deneva] Several months ago you stated that, unless they change their policy, it will be they and not the BSP who will sing their swan song. Do you still think so?

[Lilov] Yes, I warned them about this melody, that those who think that the BSP will sing it are wrong. A self-perception such as this is simply not to be taken seriously. You must have the ability to govern and must realize that the development of society may give rise to other forces better able to govern than you are.

[Deneva] Do you think that the third censure of Filip Dimitrov was deliberately devised?

[Lilov] This move was very strange. I believe that it is an expression of shallow analysis of the situation, or even of inadequate government maturity, unless it is someone's deliberate act.

[Deneva] The majority is convinced that the latter is the case.

[Lilov] If this is true, there is an explanation. This person should have been removed in the same manner. They could have preserved their administration, inasmuch as they have been legitimately elected. What prevented them from nominating another cabinet if a single party is unable to form a particular cabinet? This is the weak point. Consider France; the governments of Rocard, Cresson, and Beregovoy were replaced in the space of a year. I am astonished that the SDS has not set out on a path advantageous to it and has elected to throw one politician to the lions. Behind this story are relationships that we are still unable to analyze for you, because we do not have enough information.

[Deneva] You are not looking for this information?

[Lilov] I think that there is a crisis in the SDS. It consists of a fierce struggle between the extremist far right, which has now taken over the leadership, and the faction that wants to realize the conservative ideal by moderate policy.

[Deneva] Would the economic interests of the individual groups not provide a more mundane explanation?

[Lilov] There is no doubt about it. Behind some of them are others who in the future will label themselves big business, which is enriching itself so disreputably now, and behind the others stand the less affluent strata of society.

[Deneva] The DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] has served its larger coalition partners fairly well, but it is provoking a crisis. Is this due to concern for its own starving electorate, or do you detect another reason?

[Lilov] I believe the basic reason to be that the DPS is losing touch with its electorate, which is suffering horribly from the laws passed with DPS votes. The electorate is already finding it difficult to rely on the DPS, no matter how specific it may be. There are other reasons as well, ones of a political nature. The DPS senses the danger to itself in becoming a political satellite of the SDS.

[Deneva] Do you expect elections to be held soon, then?

[Lilov] Unfortunately I expect, I fear, that Bulgaria is entering the zone of early spring elections. It may turn out that the other political forces are not prepared to establish the government that the country needs. The BSP does not want to govern, and this should be very clear. All it wants is to participate in creation of a stable government.

[Deneva] And why does the BSP not want to govern? Surely you have a very precise idea of the answer to this question.

[Lilov] The BSP governed for a long time. When parties do this they grow tired, just as people do. Moreover, the party has to go through a process of change, to assimilate the valuable features of democracy, both as governing party and when in the opposition. This will help it shape a new type of politician.

[Deneva] Which politicians of the party would you point to as your hope for the future?

[Lilov] Among the youngest I would give only four names: Yanaki Stoilov, Zhan Videnov, Nikolay Kamov, and Aleksandur Marinov. This is the generation in its thirties. I believe it is not only the most modern one in its thinking but is also freer of the burden of the past. We also have a good middle-aged generation of people 40 to 50 years old. In it I place Georgi Pirinski, Aleksandur Tomov, Yordan Shkolagerski, Georgi Bozhinov, and a whole group of interesting women.

[Deneva] But despite this fact society is convinced that you hold the strings in your hands. We know that you reject this charge, but how can you convince us that you are merely the head of a scientific center?

[Lilov] I have had to live through a very difficult period of party development, from December 1989 to the last congress. This period may have shaped some notion leading you to exaggerate my role. I did not want to be a puppeteer in the party, because there are no puppets in it. It is 101 years old and has created politicians, and so there is no need for a puppeteer figure.

[Deneva] But is there no need for a sort of guru?

[Lilov] It has need of the intellect of the rank and file and of the leaders. I am one of the persons in the party who do not reject the socialist idea and who are renewing and purging the party. This is how I view myself in the BSP. I do not want to be something more than what I am.

[Deneva] You are too modest, Mr. Lilov. Even the most recent incident of your anger toward Mrs. Ananieva two weeks ago indicates this.

[Lilov] I do not deny that I criticized Nora sharply, but I respect her. I believe that she made a serious mistake by nominating one of the hopes of the party, Yanaki Stoilov, as president of the parliament in a manner that cannot withstand criticism. It is for this reason that I subjected her to sharp criticism, but it does not represent anything other than criticism.

[Deneva] Perhaps time will tell if it was more than criticism. But is the "legend of the unending conflict with Lukanov" (these are your words) continuing to unfold?

[Lilov] I must ask you not to comment on the subject of Lukanov and my relations with him while he is at Razvigor. I will be at your disposal the moment he leaves it.

[Deneva] Several months ago you stated that you were preparing a major Balkan political science analysis and promised to have it ready in autumn. If you still have the first analyses, do you know what is in store for us in the light of the universal chaos and the chaos in our country?

[Lilov] The analysis aspires to be objective without conforming to the interests of the political forces in the country. The aim is to reveal the truth of the Balkan situation. It will be ready by the middle of December. What I see is a highly complex and unstable regional situation. It can be localized within the confines of the Yugoslav conflict, but could spread and reach into Kosovo, or, God forbid, into Macedonia. Consider then that there will be war in the Balkans. The second thing is that two very strong currents are taking shape in the Balkans. The first is in the direction of Europeanization of the Balkans and integration into Europe, and the other in exactly the opposite direction. There is a danger of re-Balkanization, splitting up into separate countries, exacerbation of the contradictions, spread of the centers of tension, and resolution of the conflicts by force.

[Deneva] Will the new elections replicate the alignment of forces in parliament such as exists today?

[Lilov] Unlike most observers, I believe that the situation in Bulgaria is unfolding in such a way that a mirror-image duplication of the current situation is impossible. I expect parties to enter the parliament that will improve the configuration and will modify the alignment of forces. Of course, the two giants will remain.

[Deneva] Do you think that the trend in Eastern Europe toward restoration of leftist parties to power after parliamentary elections will be repeated in Bulgaria as well?

[Lilov] This will definitely happen in some elections, but I do not know precisely the ones in which this will occur.

Dimitrov Comments on Monarchy, Former Yugoslavia

93BA0337A Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 11 Nov 92 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Filip Dimitrov, former Bulgarian prime minister, by journalist Isabel San Sebastian; place and date not given: "His Majesty Tsar Simeon Is the Moral Starting Point for the Bulgarian Political Class"]

[Text] "It is a fact that in Bulgarian history most critical moments are related to the monarchy." "The West did not hear us in 1989 and confused its wishes with Yugoslav reality; now it is too late." "I despise any kind of racism, fascism, and communism."

On 8 November 1992 the Spanish newspaper ABC published an extensive interview granted to the journalist Isabel San Sebastian by resigned Bulgarian Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov. Because of the great interest it caused, we are hereby publishing the full text of the interview. In the original it is richly illustrated with five photographs of Filip Dimitrov and one of Mr. Dimitrov with the newspaper's representative. We have simply put the questions in bold characters for the sake of greater clarity.

A worthy representative of this collection of ethnic groups, ideas, and cultures, which Bulgaria is and has always been, Filip Dimitrov resembles a Slavic priest of the 19th century: very dark beard and hair, deep-set eyes, high cheekbones, and a mysterious half-smile. He speaks like an intellectual who has gone to Oxford, and he acts like any good Oriental, without ever revealing all his cards and without losing track of his thoughts. He systematically avoids any direct question, keeps his distance, and does not entirely reveal himself. He once again convinced me of the difficulty of deciphering the complex hieroglyph of that small country in the Balkans....

This person who, until the 28th of October, was the head of the Bulgarian government, is a 36-year-old lawyer, without a past history of being "persecuted by" or having been "an associate" of the communists. This is rare in that part of the world. He is a member of the Green Party and is the person who has headed and maintained, at great pain, the unity of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], a coalition of more than 15 small political groups, which won in the last elections.

As I walked to his office, I glanced, as I have on other occasions, at the statue of Tsar Nicholas II on horseback, which stands on one of the noble Sofia squares, several meters away from the mausoleum where, until recently, the mummy of another historically known person, Dimitrov, was exhibited, in this case Georgi, the "father" of Stalinism in Bulgaria.

In reality, this is the only nation east of the old "Iron Curtain" in which the veneration for the "great defeater of the Turks" has never stopped, and whose memory is respected to this day, when all noted symbols after the "glory" awarded to their killers have been brought down.

On the anniversary of the assumption of power by the first noncommunist government in four decades, I walk along those almost familiar streets and I can note that despite all suffering, underground political wars of doubtful purity, witchhunting, dirty little games and questionable enrichments, and savage battles for power and for economic survival, slowly the country is advancing toward the future, toward peace.

[San Sebastian] What balance do you draw from your administration? Were you able to bring to a safe port the economic reforms that were your priority?

[Dimitrov] This was a difficult year during which, nonetheless, a great many things were accomplished. We passed the law on privatization, and we initiated the process of effective privatization of enterprises and other state property. We began to attract foreign investments in the building and telecommunications industries, for example.

[San Sebastian] How is the process of adaptation of the Bulgarian people to democratic coexistence and a market economy developing?

[Dimitrov] You realize that this is not an easy process. Furthermore, there are many prejudices and difficulties along this way.

Constitutional Monarchy

[San Sebastian] Why have all Bulgarian politicians gone to Madrid in recent months to meet with Tsar Simeon?

[Dimitrov] And why should Bulgarian politicians not go to be acquainted with His Majesty Tsar Simeon and describe to him their problems and views, when he is part, an important part, of Bulgarian history? His Majesty is presently playing a very important moral role; actually, he is the moral starting point of the Bulgarian political class today.

[San Sebastian] How do you rate the constitutional monarchy?

[Dimitrov] This is a system that exists in many countries in Europe and for which I feel a profound respect, the same type of respect that I feel for many republics.

[San Sebastian] What was the role of the monarchy in Bulgarian history?

[Dimitrov] It is a fact that in Bulgarian history most critical moments are related to the monarchy: the 1885 unification under Prince Alexander Battenberg; independence, after which Ferdinand, the grandfather of His Majesty Tsar Simeon, ascended to the throne; and many other positive actions that are ascribed to Tsar Boris, such as, for example, his defense of the Bulgarian Jews in the face of the Nazi attempts to destroy them.

[San Sebastian] To what extent did the communists distort this historical reality?

[Dimitrov] Difficult to say, for the entire Bulgarian history was distorted by them in a truly "blinding," not to say dramatic, way.

[San Sebastian] What is your view of the role played by King Juan Carlos in Spain?

[Dimitrov] I believe that throughout the world the opinion is one and the same, that King Juan Carlos played a crucial role in the consolidation of democracy in Spain. I had the honor of meeting him personally during my recent visit to Spain for the opening of the Olympic Games, and a brief conversation sufficed for me to understand why he inspires such unanimous respect. Bulgaria's situation is different. His Majesty Tsar Simeon is not in the country, for which reason his influence or impact on the situation is of a moral nature.

[San Sebastian] Do you think that Bulgaria needs a strong stable and respected institution?

[Dimitrov] What Bulgaria needs, and I am sure that it will attain it, is to obey the law and for its institutions to be able to resolve their problems in a peaceful and democratic manner. It would be unnatural in the present transitional period, when democracy is being established, to demand the breakup of the institutions established by the Constitution.

Political Instability

[San Sebastian] Were you able to work efficiently despite the frequent political crises experienced by the country?

[Dimitrov] I do not know what "efficiently" means in this case, for I am unfamiliar with any situation not involving strikes, protests, and all kinds of opposition, which is natural for a process of dramatic changes experienced by this country.

[San Sebastian] Do you believe that such political instability is responsible to a certain extent for the relative international isolation in which Bulgaria finds itself?

[Dimitrov] In my view, political instability cannot be determined on the basis of the existence of various options and political views but of the inability of the institutions to find constitutional ways to deal with such differences; we find such ways in this country. Furthermore, I do not agree that Bulgaria is an unstable country, the more so when you compare it with what is taking place in the other former communist countries. We dedicated all our efforts to creating an atmosphere of tolerance in order to resolve peacefully our differences and to avoid the excitement of stress, emotions, and clashes that many people anticipated, but which did not happen.

Western Wishes and Yugoslav Reality

[San Sebastian] That happened in the former Yugoslavia.... What is the view from here on that bloody war?

[Dimitrov] It is a very unpleasant experience. Unfortunately, neither governments nor international organizations paid attention to what said in the summer of 1989, when all of this began. They continued to confuse their wishes with Yugoslav reality. Today only the concentrated use of force could stop this slaughter, and although we would like very much for the international public to double its efforts to resolve the conflict, I understand very well the reasons for which it is not doing so. At the present

moment I do not know how and when any kind of step could be taken to resolve the crisis in Bosnia. However, I greatly hope that the civilized countries throughout the world will understand very well that the most tragic thing that could happen in Europe would be the widening of this war.

[San Sebastian] Is this possible? Could Bulgaria, for example, see itself involved in the war?

[Dimitrov] You realize that if Kosovo or Macedonia become involved in the conflict, the flames will touch upon the neighboring areas, whether Albania or Bulgaria. I do not know the extent to which the Bulgarian Government or the government of any other nation would be able to control the situation once thousands of people have started crossing the borders and speak of abuse, insult, torture, and the death of their brothers, neighbors, cousins, or friends on the other side of the border. That is why in my view it is of exceptional importance to prevent such a situation from occurring. That is why it is exceptionally dangerous for Macedonia to remain isolated, without international recognition, as an object of temptation for any possible aggressor, not to mention the situation in Kosovo, which probably needs the taking of urgent steps and guarantees by the international public for the sake of preventing a huge slaughter.

[San Sebastian] Would you support the use of force by the international community to stop the slaughter in Bosnia and to prevent future tragedies?

[Dimitrov] Several months ago I warned that in the Balkans military measures could be taken either late or too late. Today we no longer have such options. It is already too late and many people have perished and there are no solutions to the problems that have appeared.

[San Sebastian] Is the West unable to understand the Balkans?

[Dimitrov] No. Like any other part of the world, the Balkans are entirely understandable. In the final account, they are part of Europe, but it is true that there are some aspects here that are easier to understand for us, who live here, for which reason people should listen to us once in a while, when we give our opinion on what is occurring here.

"Ethnic Cleansing"

[San Sebastian] Bulgaria has a strong Turkish Muslim minority; what is your view on the "ethnic cleansing" carried out by the Serbs in Bosnia?

[Dimitrov] I despise any kind of racism, fascism, and communism.

[San Sebastian] Will Bulgaria solve the problem of its Turkish minority?

[Dimitrov] It is obvious to the entire world that we fought firmly for the defense of human rights, when the SDS was supporting in parliament an entire series of laws proposed by the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS], which is the party of the Turkish minority and which extensively meets their requirements.

[San Sebastian] What was the price paid for the support of the Turks, which you needed?

[Dimitrov] If you are referring to the economic price, we believed that it was necessary to use the money for the resolution of the social problems facing the Turks in our country as a consequence of what had happened during the communist period. If you are referring to the political scene, the SDS proved that although it supported close cooperation with our allies in the DPS, it was not prepared to abandon its programs and its principles.

The New Communist Regime

[San Sebastian] Was your government not sufficiently stable?

[Dimitrov] This depends on whether people read the newspapers or follow the events: Although 75 percent of the electorate voted against communism in the past elections, today 80 percent of the press is in the hands of people who are close to what was in the past the Bulgarian Communist Party. The study of reality reveals that the government was achieving its program for financial stability (which was not easy) and was able to meet the requirements, including those that were of a less realistic nature, of some trade unions, so that, in the final account, it was doing its job.

[San Sebastian] What type of cooperation did you have from the former communists, who are today socialists, in administering the country?

[Dimitrov] The Communist Party has not changed its concept of power. This is perhaps the reason for which part of its members—I do not know whether they are currently party members or not—continue to try to rule and control the resources of the country in one way or another. Many members of the communist nomenclature acquired tremendous wealth, which they are using to become the new capitalists. In my view, the most dangerous are not these people but those who, using funds diverted from the Communist Party, and with the participation of the secret services and some trade unions, are trying to control the levers of economic power and are aspiring to achieve real power, bypassing the democratic institutions. This is an openly communist viewpoint.

[San Sebastian] Does this justify the detention of Andrey Lukanov, the former prime minister, after he was deprived of his parliamentary immunity, or is this a case of political repression?

[Dimitrov] Lukanov's detention is based on the very simple fact that during the previous regime he was politically responsible for giving large amounts of money from this country to terrorist groups for their training, equipment, weapon purchases, and so on. He is also politically responsible for the time during which this country was led to dislocation and economic misfortune in a way that we believe was deliberate and conscious. Someone had to assume responsibility for this.

[San Sebastian] Did such groups include ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty] terrorists?

[Dimitrov] Other names showed up, but this case has still not been investigated.

[San Sebastian] What is the state of Spanish-Bulgarian relations?

[Dimitrov] Spain and Bulgaria have been virtually deprived of the opportunity to develop their bilateral relations for the duration of the long communist period. It is also obvious that in this case there is a tremendous area for cooperation and exchanges not only in the economic but also in the institutional and cultural areas. I do not know whether you could imagine or whether your country is aware of the tremendous interest of Spanish culture in Bulgaria. At the same time, I believe that we are providing good investment opportunities.

[San Sebastian] Why is Bulgaria not mentioned among countries that could join the EC at the beginning of the next millennium?

[Dimitrov] This question should not be addressed to me. Bulgaria has dedicated a great deal of effort and has taken important steps to transform its economy and, in my view, we shall very soon be able to prove that it is senseless to speak of differences that separate us from the other post-communist countries, such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia. I realize that the integration of the EC is complex and would not take place in a few months. However, I am confident that we shall be able to reach the status of associated nation under proper circumstances and within a reasonably short time.

Arms Commission Secretary on Arms Deals, Exports
 93BA0312A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
 27 Nov 92 p 4

[Report by Georgi Bozduganov, secretary of the Governmental Commission for Control Over the Regulations Governing the Production of and Trade in Military and Special Ordnance: "Our Road to Europe Does Not Go Through Illegal Arms Trafficking"]

[Text] In December 1991 a strike broke out at the Arsenal plant in Kazanluk, one of the most modern defense production enterprises. It was organized by the Podkrepa Labor Confederation. Losses at the plant are estimated into the millions of leva daily. The management was replaced and a new—trade-union—management took over. It closed down production facilities and, for a period of seven months, made the rounds of banks, begging for payroll funds. The personnel come to work but remain idle. This is not their fault. Last July, again with the help of the trade unions, yet another management team was appointed. Slight efforts were made to revive the production process, but so far no particular results have been achieved. However, the debt to the banks is already exceeding 680 million leva.

A number of meetings between the board of directors and the prime minister, members of the Governmental Commission for Control Over the Regulation Governing the Production of and Trade in Military and Special Ordnance, and the lending banks were requested and held. The

leadership was asked by the prime minister to submit a program for production development if it were to obtain money from the State Fund for Reconstruction and Development. So far not even a single stroke has been written. It was made clear at the meetings that the problem of the debt can be settled only within the framework of an overall plan drafted by the government that would resolve the problem of accumulated obligations of industrial enterprises. Last October, the trade-union leaders who were dismantling Arsenal in December 1991 took the workers to the Council of Ministers, telling them that the government was to be blamed for everything. At an emergency session of the Council of Ministers specific commitments were made. A new commission was appointed to replace the one, which had been appointed by Dimitur Ludzhev, but which had done nothing for nine months. The new liquidation commission was set up by the Main Engineering Administration of the Ministry of Defense. In pursuing the liquidation of the enterprise, it assumed the obligation to distribute the \$50 million owed by the former USSR among the arms manufacturers. With the help of the Arms Commission a loan of 350 million leva was secured from a bank consortium. At the time that the initial amounts were to be transferred to Arsenal, the directors gave mandatory leave to 7,000 workers and the trade unions directed them to halt the trains.

Such is the sad story for which someone must be held responsible. Now, under the veil of secrecy, efforts are being made to shift the guilt to the governmental commission; it is being blamed for the failure of perfect deals. Such is the actual state of affairs.

Despite numerous requests submitted by exporting firms and the overall trade license granted to Arsenal-Kazanluk, the enterprise has signed export contracts this year that are far below its actual production capacity. According to the official study of the Ministry of Industry, the company has been able to produce... no more than 18 percent of the agreed-upon quantities. For example, since last year goods have been stored in the Arsenal warehouses that are worth 325 million leva, based on a contract already concluded and secured with a bank letter of credit, but there is no one to produce finished goods worth 7 million leva. Meanwhile, the officials in charge are not lifting a finger to secure that amount through imports. An advantageous contract has been signed for exports worth over \$15 million, but the cartridge manufacturing plant has been closed for quite some time.

The company did not even bother to answer an offer to sell 30 million levas' worth of Kalashnikov automatic weapons, which was received in May. The demand of another company, again for Kalashnikovs, worth more than 70 million leva, met with open refusal. There also are problems with some of the executed contracts. On a request for goods worth 60 million leva, the exporting broker has still not transferred the funds. According to a contract signed in June, goods worth in excess of 100 million leva remain packed but not shipped out because of

problems with the customers. Recently Arsenal became involved in a series of purchase and resale operations of goods of much lower quality compared to those that the company could produce itself. Such activities not only undermine the reputation already acquired on the international market by the company's trademark, but they also prolong the forced idling of basic production facilities. It is not hard to estimate that so far an income of no less than 700 million leva has not been earned for production and organizational reasons.

As to the government commission, which has lately been so frequently blamed, one could hardly be able to find convincing arguments in support of the idea that positions have been lost on the international arms market and that its activities have worsened the condition of our national military industry. In the first 10 months of this year the government commission has issued permits for the export of military and special ordnance for an amount, in dollars, of twice that the Kinteks company was able to export last year (excluding deals with the Philippines and Bolivia, which will be discussed later). The permits that were issued were for a value not twice but eight to nine times higher, providing that:

1. The military industry enterprises would suitably react to the needs of the market, i.e., requests for goods worth many millions of dollars were not met, not because of prohibitions imposed by the commission, but because the producers were unable to deliver the goods sought by the foreign customers.

2. It was not by the fault of the management that advantageous contracts for organizing joint production with leading foreign companies, for goods worth hundreds of millions of dollars, were delayed and, in fact, blocked.

3. Official offers for the purchasing of military and special ordnance, submitted by politically and economically promising countries, were not rejected through circuitous ways. The following case is indicative: After an inadmissible leak of information about the intentions of a country to purchase military hardware, backed by a letter of guarantee issued by a first-rate London bank, worth one-half of a billion dollars, unauthorized representatives of Bulgarian companies established contacts with lightning speed. In fact, the execution of such a contract was postponed for the time when Bulgaria would have a different government and a new commission that would exercise a weaker financial control over different company sales on commission.

4. Disloyal competition by Bulgarian firms has not driven away a number of serious customers. Recently, a former foreign trade official was able to penetrate the Boyana residency, where a delegation of an African country was staying, assigned by its president to sign a contract for weapons worth a total of \$30 million. On the following day the delegation set new and entirely unacceptable conditions for our country, which made the conclusion of the contract impossible.

The current members of the government commission, which has been at work since last June, have rejected only

one significant deal that could politically discredit the country and that, from the economic viewpoint, meant selling out the interests of Bulgarian weapons manufacturers at a price 20 times lower than the adequate price in this case. The implementation of two other deals was postponed because of suspicion of arms smuggling, and no permission should have been issued until the countries indicated as end users would confirm that the required ordnance was for their own needs.

For reasons that need no explanation the commission has not discussed at its sessions specific requirements for exporting weapons to Macedonia.

It is unnecessary to explain the need for strict international control over such specific activities. And although arms exports are unquestionably something entirely normal, Bulgaria's commercial behavior in the past caused suspicions in Europe and throughout the world. That is why, apparently, in an extensive interview granted to THE NEW YORK TIMES in August 1990, Mr. Saldzhiski, the newly appointed general director of Kinteks, asserted that he personally will do everything possible to block deliveries to dishonest partners who reexport the goods to forces of terrorism, or to areas subject to embargo. The importance of this publication in the civilized world is obvious not only by the fact that it made the front page (in that same issue an article on President Zhelev was published in another section) but also the fact that it was reprinted with lightning speed by the most authoritative European English-language newspaper—THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE.

In more specific terms, the way the Kinteks company promoted its trade in 1990-92 is not entirely clear because of the lack of sufficiently clear legal documents that regulate its activities, lack of a functioning government commission, and the fact that the various archive units of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations were not retained after the ministry was closed down. The Government Commission headed by D. Ludzhev began work as late as December 1991, although its responsibility and membership had been determined by a Council of Ministers resolution six months earlier. It began by issuing permits for goods worth tens of millions of dollars, signed by D. Ludzhev or by the secretary, without holding any meetings until the end of February, when the commission met for the first time. No investigations whatsoever were made. In the first seven months, until its membership was changed and the commission became headed by the prime minister, the accuracy of even a single end user document was not checked.

Some of the Unpleasant Consequences Are Well-Known

Initially, Kinteks submitted documents for the export of weapons fictitiously issued by the Ministry of Defense of the Philippines. The faxed certificates carried the code of the Polish Cenzin company, despite the strict requirement that in such cases original documents only are to be used. Together with the Bilshipping enterprise Kinteks organized exports of weapons marked in ships' documents as

"technical equipment," giving Rotterdam-New York-Manila as the itinerary. It is hardly necessary to guess the reaction of Dutch and U.S. customs officials when they saw cases containing Kalashnikovs while holding in their hands Bulgarian documents marked "technical equipment." During that time export permits listing fraudulently the Philippines Ministry of Defense as the end user were issued for a total of \$15 million. Some of these permits were signed by D. Ludzhev without a meeting of the commission. In March, foreign brokers for the "Philippine" deals were detained in the United States and Germany, charged with supplying weapons to Iraq. Kinteks' old partners T. Kopervats and Z. Tarka, who worked for Cenzin, managed to escape detention and, to this day, are being sought by U.S. justice authorities.

Kinteks was subsequently to claim to have exported only a single container and to have been unable to complete the deal based on permits issued for \$15 million. Let us hope that such is indeed the case. All the documents in this case were submitted to the Bulgarian authorities by the U.S. Department of State. In answer to the subsequent query, the Philippines Government stated in an official note presented to Ambassador Naumov that all certificates were entirely forged and that their country had made no requests for such arms procurements.

The "Bolivian" Case

This case is a virtual duplication of the one we described. Once again a series of forged certificates were presented, this time the fictitious end user being the Bolivian Ministry of Defense. The deal involved an old Kinteks broker—the ETEM Portuguese company. Permits for export were issued without any investigation. Some of the permits were signed by D. Ludzhev without summoning the commission. One of them alone was for \$9.11 million. Another permit for export of weapons worth \$25.6 million was issued on trust, without any certificate being presented. Obviously, Mr. Ludzhev and other members of the commission considered as an unnecessary detail the strict requirements stipulated in the regulation and the directives.

Apparently experienced directors and professionals, who assure the rest of the world of their most honorable intentions on the front pages of the international press, and a perfectly functioning commission of highly competent reformers seem unable to make a basic assessment of the propriety of a number of deals. This is an amazing gullibility, considering that even a brief investigation would have made it crystal clear that Bolivia does not have T-55 and T-72 tanks or Soviet 152-mm artillery systems and, consequently, could not have used shells worth millions of dollars, such as it allegedly requested of Bulgaria.

Even a study of a statistical reference manual would indicate that Bolivia is an economically underdeveloped country with a negative trade balance and annual imports worth a few hundred million dollars and a rate of inflation exceeding 1,000 percent, which would make it impossible to set aside tens of millions of dollars for ammunition and, subsequently, hundreds of millions of dollars for heavy tanks and artillery to pay for its purchases from Bulgaria.

Given such prerequisites for the legitimacy of the end user, a timely query would make it clear to the then membership of the commission precisely what the present commission found out. Minister of Internal Affairs Saavedra and General Lorinzeti, commander in chief of the Armed Forces, officially stated that Bolivia has neither purchased nor ordered arms of the described variety and, at the same time, requested that the certificates be given to them for investigation.

It was established that, once again, it was a matter of gross forgery. Names of fictitious individuals and positions in the Bolivian Ministry of Defense were used. The text of the documents even includes spelling errors that are atypical of the Spanish language but are particularly typical in Portuguese. Pressed by the facts, the president of the Portuguese ETEM company admitted to a Bulgarian official representative in Lisbon that he would have no problem in obtaining any kind of false certificate he may need.

One can only guess the identity of the actual purchaser, without, however, forgetting that substantial amounts of money for such ammunition could be spent not only by Iraq but also by countries closer to our own borders. Each country that is not subject to the UN embargo and which does not support terrorism or is engaged in bloodshedding wars could purchase quite legally from Bulgaria the necessary arms it needs. In the opposite case, as a rule, forged documents with fictitious end users are used. In such cases, however, the price is much higher, and although the arms manufacturers are paid the regular amount, someone's bank account in a foreign country may increase astronomically.

The time span for such smuggling operations is usually short, and they quickly become known to the foreign information services. In cases of failure to exercise efficient export control by the government commission, considering the existence of such serious suspicions and the subsequent exposure of the smuggling operation of arms to an area subject to embargo, the reaction of the international public and of the United Nations is inevitable. The authority of the prime minister and the other ministers and members of the government commission would be severely questioned. The system of smuggling weapons with lack of governmental control and the significant damage done to Bulgaria's good reputation and international prestige could lead to a vote of no confidence in the prime minister much more easily than would any fabricated unscrupulous fabrication of selling weapons to Macedonia.

What is amazing is that despite the punctilious work that was done and the fact that double the volume of exports has been achieved compared to each individual recent year, there still are people who are addressing stupid accusations of blocked deals and are speculating on the financial problems of the enterprises. Asen Michkovski, Radoslav Menov, and Krust'o Petkov are either misled or are working for someone's destructive interests. Are there any perfect deals? And what about those involving the

Philippines and Bolivia or, perhaps, any other illegal deals that they personally have made and that remain unknown to the commission? I do not wish to accuse anyone, but let us consider the eventual purpose of the creation of difficulties, or making use of old financial problems in the military-industrial complex. The breakup of the plants in Kazanluk for purposes of easier future privatization, or elimination of the government commission by appointing obedient employees, ready to close their eyes to the illegal export of weapons? Or could it be both? According to some people, this is to be achieved through insinuations and speculations on the hardship of the workers who have been laid off.

One hill separates Arsenal-Kazanluk from the DZU [factory] in Stara Zagora, and it is as though someone would like to serve interests that are entirely contraindicated to producers on either side of the hill. The DZU people are impatiently awaiting the results of current meetings in Paris on lifting international bans imposed on Bulgaria by COCOM [Coordinating Committee on Export Controls]. They are well-aware of the fact that only by lifting such a regime of prohibition we would have access to global supertechnologies and revive in fact the entire Bulgarian industry. This is the real task to be followed with long-awaited foreign investments in the fields of electronics, telecommunications, optical and nuclear technologies, chemistry, and others, which ensure competitive production on a global standard and, consequently, jobs for hundreds of thousands of producers.

On the other side of the hill efforts are being made to insinuate that the government must be pressured to allow exports of weapons wherever there is shooting, regardless of the fact that the sanctions against us would inevitably be 100 times harsher and that the entire Bulgarian industry would collapse totally. Apparently it is not taken into consideration that it is only by maintaining civilized international commercial relations and providing efficient export control that we can solve the problems on both sides, for the path to Europe is not a path of illegal arms trafficking.

Kintex Director on Political Interference

93BA0364A Sofia 168 CHASA in Bulgarian 1 Dec 92 p 7

[Interview of Kintex general director Anton Saldzhiyski by Zoya Dimitrova; place and date not given: "Bozduganov Continues To Hammer Kintex"]

[Text] *Rich markets are looking for arms, which Kintex is unable to make, according to Kintex general director Anton Saldzhiyski.*

[Dimitrova] Mr. Saldzhiyski, the campaign that has been in progress for several months now against Kintex suggests a single answer, namely, that you should not be there.

[Saldzhiyski] If there is such an intent, Bulgaria will be the only loser. We have operated exclusively in accordance with existing standards, the Regulation on Exports and Imports of Special Products. All our transactions have passed through the Government Commission for Control of Production and of Commerce in Special Goods. This has also been stated quite clearly both by the National Security Commission and by the Economic Commission of Parliament, to which we submitted full documentation in September. The opinion expressed by the specially appointed subcommission chaired by Ivan Pavlev was that Kintex has operated strictly in accordance with regulations in force and has never made a mistake in its work. I do not see at all what fault could be found with us and why the attacks on the company should continue.

[Dimitrova] The charge is made that, despite end user documents for Bolivia or Kenya, these countries are not armed with the Soviet weapons you sell, and it is logical for you to suspect that the arms you sell may not be going there, despite documents in perfect order.

[Saldzhiyski] We could suspect many other things as well, but the question is whether or not we want to sell them. In addition, it has always been a tempting prospect for us to have a market on such a remote continent as South America. While arms of the Soviet type are not very common there, there is nothing to keep us from trying to supply them on that continent.

[Dimitrova] Has the government commission spoiled any Kintex transactions over this last year?

[Saldzhiyski] In addition to the Bolivian transaction, there is another one that has been held up for some time, despite the fact that a permit was issued. The commission has been making preliminary checks for several months now. Nothing has come of it. In effect, this transaction has been suspended.

[Dimitrova] At what cost?

[Saldzhiyski] The cost is considerable.

[Dimitrova] The government commission is constantly issuing evaluations of the Kintex Company. What is your assessment of the government commission?

[Saldzhiyski] My personal opinion is that it should have a different set of members. We cannot expect a commission consisting of six ministers and the prime minister to be able to keep abreast of matters relating to control of the arms trade. Even less so can we expect that there will be no delays. In a country such as France this commission is made up of the heads of divisions in particular ministries interested in control of this activity and of deputy ministers. Whenever the commission has specific doubts or demands, they can be examined by the government itself.

[Dimitrova] What do you expect in the immediate future?

[Saldzhiyski] The competition in this market continues to be especially strong. Some of our traditional partners, ones with whom we worked for many years, now have an embargo imposed on them, and work with them has been halted. Other countries in which we have a certain presence have also drastically reduced their demands on us. One serious market for our arms industry, the former Warsaw Pact countries, is buying virtually nothing from us. The Bulgarian Army has also greatly reduced its orders placed with the military industrial complex. What this

means is that business prospects for the coming years are not very good. As for new customers, I do not think that the situation is all that simple, for a number of reasons. One of the reasons is that currently potential new markets, and very solvent ones at that, are asking for weapons that we are unable to produce. As a result of all this, the military industrial complex has a gloomy future. There is something else that must not be forgotten: New markets are opened with the very active support and cooperation of the government. This applies to absolutely all countries that produce and sell weapons.

Csurka's 'Hungarian Way' Issues Statement
93CH0203C Budapest MAGYAR FORUM in Hungarian
3 Dec 92 p 4

[Statement issued by the board of directors of the Hungarian Way Foundation; date not given: "The Activity of the Circles of the Hungarian Way Foundation"]

[Text] Today society judges organizations and institutions not by words, but by actions. No movement, be it political, social, or cultural, should be launched without the proper foundation of lesser and greater actions. Therefore, the newly created and centrally registered Hungarian Way Circles should start their activities immediately. It is advisable that they introduce themselves to the local public: We, so and so, are members of the Hungarian Way Circle, and first we will do this and this.

It is important that the local Hungarian Way begin not with the criticism of existing conditions, the local power, and the local, oftentimes evil conditions, that is to say, with the spread of discontent, but with positive action. Our criticism to existing conditions consists in doing something different, something new, something better and good.

New, although we are conservative.

It is important that the first function, first meeting, let in involve only a small group, express our ideals, our Hungarian identity, in its system of symbols, order of ceremony, its dignity and character.

It is important that the authority of the Circle be its own authority, an authority based on the trust evoked by the life's work, career and creed of the people who make up the Circle. Every activity for the sake of appearances is to be avoided; the important thing is not quick success but a good foundation. Let us start small, by setting goals which we can certainly attain; the cumulative effect will be felt later.

Cultural activity is very important. The dissemination and protection of Hungarian culture, the demonstration of value in contrast to the influx of inferiority is, at the same time, the most important political action directed at protecting the nation.

The lecturers of the Hungarian Way should distinguish themselves by their thorough preparation, profound knowledge of the given topic, and sentences that are understandable to everyone. The lecturers and publications of the Hungarian Way should only use unavoidable foreign words and expressions that have been established in Hungarian and are understandable to everyone. They should honor each other and the interested listeners with their carefully chosen words. In this way, everything in the Hungarian Way will be easy to understand, exact, and clear. No one should stay away from the Circle because he doesn't—cannot—understand what is spoken there.

Let us pay attention to each other. Let us listen to each other. Let us look the person we talk to in the eye. Let us demand that he, too, look us in the eye. A monologue is

forbidden! Those who are only interested in their own voice will remain alone; we want unity.

The message of the Hungarian Way is that it is possible to live differently.

The establishment of the first topics and actions should be based on an evaluation of the situation. The Circle should evaluate the most important tasks, determine the order of action, and based on that, appoint the time and place of the programs. Obviously, the tasks and possibilities of circles are different in villages than in cities. Of course, in a city there can be more than one circle at the same time. It is important that these know and respect each other, and divide the tasks among themselves.

The people in villages and townships today are first and foremost interested in the problems of compensation, the acquisition of land, the transformation of cooperatives, the question of staying in the cooperative or leaving. There is a great lack of information and a resulting defenselessness. The Hungarian Way Circle will act properly if it selects and addresses one or two people or families, and listens to them. All this should be friendly and personal. Mass programs can also be useful, but it is more important than anything else that the abandoned people should feel that someone cares for them, that someone is genuinely interested in their fate. From man to man, from Hungarian to Hungarian.

The Hungarian Way Circle should seek contact with organizations which already have experience in this work: parties, farmers circles, self-governments; it should assist them and should call their attention to the Circle's experiences.

For larger, more extensive circles that have already demonstrated their strength and legitimacy by other programs and actions, we recommend the following novel program.

Social Court of the Hungarian Way Circle.

This program is a sort of theater play patterned after the existing courts, where the roles of the accused, the court, the prosecution, and the defense are played by the Hungarian Way Circle. Its topic is a case which is the subject of local gossip: an irregularity of privatization, the preservation of property of people who were in powerful position in the previous regime, a political scandal, or anything. It is important that the legal preparation be thorough, the program not infringe on personal rights, that the circle handle the prosecution and the defense with equal objectivity, and the result not be preprogrammed. Victory is achieved when the truth is revealed, whatever it may be, and however favorable or unfavorable it might be to anyone.

It is not bad if the program is humorous. But one should avoid mimicking the accused by the actor who impersonates him.

So much for now. We will continue.

Prime Minister's Office To Control Media Budgets**State Secretary Comments**

93CH0196A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 3 Dec 92 p 4

[Interview with State Secretary Tamas Katona of the Prime Minister's Office by Tamasi; place and date not given: "A Factious, Vain Dispute"]

[Text] *In the voting on the budget bill for next year in the National Assembly, a majority of members of parliament voted in favor of including the appropriations for Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television under the heading of the Prime Minister's Office. The opposition objected to this arrangement and held out the prospect of turning to the Constitutional Court. We interviewed Tamas Katona, a state secretary at the Prime Minister's Office.*

[Tamasi] Mr. State Secretary, does this arrangement really jeopardize the independence of the media?

[Katona] I do not think that this arrangement violates the Constitution in any way. Just as the autonomy of the universities is not jeopardized by the fact that their appropriations are included under the heading of the Ministry of Culture and Public Education. For the right to dispose of the funds rests with the institutions themselves, and not the ministry. I am hoping that the present situation will serve to speed up, both within the ruling parties and the opposition, passage of the media bill that will soon be in shape to be presented to Parliament for a final vote. With the media bill's passage into law, authority to spend the appropriations will be exercised not by the all-powerful media presidents, but by the boards of trustees that will be established at both Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television. Then we will be able to safely forget all about this factious and vain dispute.

I think we have heeded the opposition's advice to present a budget bill that contains a minimum number of headings and is as transparent as possible. We do not deserve criticism for having done so. The point is to avoid wherever possible separate budget headings that somehow are at odds with this country's constitutional structure. It does not occur to anyone to question the autonomy of the universities and the independence of the judiciary, just because their appropriations are included under the headings of the Ministry of Culture and Public Education and the Ministry of Justice respectively. The Hungarian judiciary would hardly have acquitted Matyas Eorsi if it were not independent.

[Tamasi] Can we expect the media bill's passage still this month?

[Katona] There are no technical obstacles to the media bill's passage still this month. We expect that the bill will be ready for Parliament to vote on it by mid-December.

Opposition Turns to Court

93CH0196B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
2 Dec 92 p 4

[Unattributed article: "The Media Affair; The Opposition Turns To the Constitutional Court"]

[Text] The opposition parties are turning to the Constitutional Court in conjunction with the National Assembly's decision on Tuesday to abolish the separate budget headings of Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television, and to include their appropriations under the heading of the Prime Minister's Office. The decision [motion to amend] was adopted by a vote of 170 for and 126 against, with 10 abstentions.

In the National Assembly the opposition parties reconciled their standpoints and agreed already then to collect the signatures of as many opposition MP's as possible—a minimum of 50 signatures is required—on a petition to the Constitutional Court for a prereview of the amendment's constitutionality, should the National Assembly give its blessings to this plan of the Antall government to destroy Hungarian Television's independence. Zoltan Gal, the leader of the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] faction, told our reporter he found it very saddening that Jozsef Antall has yielded to Csurka's will to such an extent. After all, both the government's motion to amend and the fabricated disciplinary charges against Hankiss are based on a law that the Constitutional Court has already declared unconstitutional.

The opposition parties intend to collect on the petition the signatures of as many members of parliament as possible, and are confident that the Constitutional Court will declare as unconstitutional, even before the final vote on the budget bill, the ruling majority's amendment that wants to curb freedom of the press.

At the press conference of the Free Democrats, Miklos Haraszti said that if up to now there was talk of a media war, an all-out war has now broken out, thanks to the government. Haraszti labeled as a show trial the disciplinary investigation launched against the president of Hungarian Television. In Haraszti's opinion, the government lacks authority to conduct disciplinary proceedings against the TV president. It does not exercise the employer's rights, cannot hire or fire him—the president of the republic exercises those rights—then why should it have specifically disciplinary authority over him?

According to Haraszti, the Antall government had hesitated to take this step until the very last minute, because it had not dared to invoke an unconstitutional law. But in the end, it seems, the government figured it had nothing to lose.

Ferenc Kulin (MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum]) told our reporter that, in his opinion, it was quite natural for a political party or the opposition to turn to the Constitutional Court whenever the constitutionality of a parliamentary decision was in question. The ruling parties, too, have done so. Should the Constitutional Court decide that abolition of Hungarian Television's separate budget was

unconstitutional, "then obviously everything will remain as before, until the new Media Law is enacted." After all, this was merely a motion to amend.

[Box, p 4]

On Tuesday, the Constitutional Court requested MTI [HUNGARIAN NEWS AGENCY] to publish the following announcement:

"The Constitutional Court establishes that the time limit it had set for the National Assembly to enact a Media Law has passed unsuccessfully. On 1 December, therefore, the court has ordered the resumption of the earlier suspended proceedings, for the purpose of determining the effective date of the unconstitutional law's avoidance."

Sociologist Finds Far Right Without Broad Base

93CH0213A Budapest MAGYAR NARANCS
in Hungarian 26 Nov 92 p 17

[Unattributed interview with sociologist Zsuzsa Hegedus; date and place not given: "Take Action Against Hatred"; Roll Call"]

[Text] *Sociologist Zsuzsa Hegedus has been living in France for 17 years. Since 1989, she has been participating in a research program in Hungary that is financed by the French; she originated the basic idea of the initiative that has been recently launched with the slogan "Take Action Against Hatred!"*

[MAGYAR NARANCS] How did the idea come about, and how did it get from you to physicians and schools?

[Hegedus] At one of my presentations, I met Dr. Peter Votisky, a physician at the Madarasz Street Children's Hospital. He asked me to relate my experiences to 10 or 20 medical colleagues. I did, and it was there that the idea was born that children's hospitals should give their names to the initiative. This was merely the beginning step; subsequently several other institutions joined us. Our emblem and slogan is based on a French analogy, that of the "S.O.S. Racisme" and the "Touche pas mon pote" (Keep Away From My Buddy) movements that have become extremely popular in France. My research unequivocally revealed that the nationalistic extreme right-wing ideology has no social base in Hungary. Public demand and the public value system definitely support endeavors for democracy; it is the subject of equal opportunity that has the greatest consensus in today's Hungarian society. This demand is much closer to Western societies than many people think; it is much more modern than what Hungarian political parties represent. The way I usually put it is that the public lives in the 21st century in informal society, while the political parties live in the 19th century.

On the other hand, however, poverty is reaching ever higher levels. This is the situation in which the ideology which is looking for scapegoats and which condemns diversity emerges, finding its way to the masses, recognizing that it is much easier to incite hatred than to find solutions. This is why this kind of action must be launched now. It is not enough to be a quiet democrat. What is needed is a manifesto that is not directed at parties but that

collects signatures instead. Of course, groups and communities can also join, but, even then, only individual signatures will count. And, in order to emphasize our independence from parties, we do not intend to publish any more signatures. In our original manifesto we published the list of names who helped create the movement. Now, however, we only want to publish figures that give information about our numbers, and we might also publish the names of institutions, communities, and clubs if several people from the same location write to us.

[MAGYAR NARANCS] How can one who does not have a signature slip join?

[Hegedus] By one or more persons simply signing a picture card or post card on which they write, "I agree with the call 'Take Action Against Hatred!'" and then sending it to the Madarasz Street Hospital. It is better when an entire family, workplace, or community signs the card together, and the reason is that then two, three or four weeks later we can say that our numbers have grown to a hundred thousand, a million, or two million; we may not agree on everything except in our wish to do something so that, by the time our children or our present youths grow up, this country will not be ruptured by hatred in the way our fathers have already seen.

The danger is that the far right has appeared in government ranks. As a first step, this extreme ideology should be pushed out of there. Incidentally, we are convinced that more than 90 percent of the government party does not endorse it.

[MAGYAR NARANCS] This movement needs broad propaganda. How can you inform people everywhere, even in the most remote locations, about it?

[Hegedus] First of all, we build on enthusiastic people who want to do something. Those who support us should sign, raise their hands, wear our emblems, display our stickers, and wear our T-shirts. In addition, they should also have the courage to win over their neighbors, friends, and enemies.

It is not only the fight against racial discrimination that we must undertake. Tomorrow it can easily be the poor children who will be pushed aside and be discriminated against just as it is done today with the Gypsies, Jews, and "foreigners." Because those who have no money can only wear ragged clothes to attend school. Then crippled people may be excluded because they cost too much for Hungarian society. This is the kind of hatred that can be directed against those—Lutherans, Catholics—who become part of the minority.

Poll of Students Shows Socialist Orientation

93CH0214A Budapest KAPU in Hungarian No 10, Oct 92
pp 15-18

[Article by Daniel Barcsa: "Today, Those Who Do Nothing but Shoot Off Their Mouths Are Well Off; On the Sociopolitical Value System of High School Students"]

[Text] An old Dacia is trying to squeeze in between a Mazda and a Mercedes. That box lives a life of its own, the

engine creates artificial fog like at the battle of Otranto, and the worn-out tires skid all over the place.

A small man catapults out of the car. His face red, he curses the prime minister, gasoline prices, the rain, and the mayor for parking difficulties.

On the rear window we see the coat of arms with the crown and the angels. Above the coat of arms the FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] orange boosts confidence by radiating sunshine. Behind the windshield a plastic figurine of the Virgin of Lourdes dangles back and forth, and I can hardly believe my eyes when I see that the gear shift ends in a phallic symbol.

Anyone can find hundreds of similar or even more typical examples of the confused values that characterize our society.

In May 1992 we assessed the sociopolitical value system of students at a specialized technical intermediate school in Budapest. The survey involved 227 students, most of them in the third and fourth grades who, as citizens, will be able to exercise their right to vote in the next parliamentary elections. A majority of these young people come from families whose livelihood depends on large industry now struggling to survive, with not much success. This is probably why not even one-fourth the number of our intermediate school students has a positive view of the fact that a democratic institutional system has evolved in Hungary. The majority views the previous years with an unveiled nostalgic sense.

"Things were better under Kadar," one of them wrote. "Anyone who worked and shut up was doing well. Today, those who do nothing but shoot off their mouths are well off."

Full disillusionment took the place of initial, favorable illusions related to the system change. The responses clearly show that growing difficulties in making a living, and increasing existential uncertainty, prompted this change.

Judgments regarding the performance of government are clearly negative: Three out of four youths have an adverse view of the government's workings thus far. References by the government to the heavy legacy it inherited have no effect whatsoever; the government and Jozsef Antall personally are being blamed for the decline in the standard of living and for increased unemployment.

Alienation from the new political system is clearly shown by the fact that only one-third of youth would participate in elections if they were held today.

Confidence in all political parties has diminished. This is well demonstrated by a fourth-grader's "analysis," which almost amounts to a study in political science.

"My family had great confidence in the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] because it promised a 'spring cleanup,' a strong forint, and a prosperous Hungary. We no longer believe them. We are not going to vote for the Christian Democrats either because we are not overly religious, and aside from that, they, too, are part of this

government. FIDESZ and the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] claim that they could lift this country out of the crisis; we would be inclined to believe them, except that their rock-solid anti-Hungarian attitude is very disturbing. At present the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] is promising a lot, but they already had 40 years to demonstrate their performance. Why didn't they do something for the nation during that period?"

The fact that this young man is not alone with his beliefs and struggles is proven by the small number of people who would be willing to vote for any one of the parties if the elections were held today. (See Table 1.)

Table 1

Rank of Parties	Party	No. of Votes Students Would Cast
1.	FIDESZ	26
2.	MDF-IDF ¹	8
3.	MSZP	6
4.	FKgP ²	5
5.	MSZMP ³	4
	SZDSZ	4
6.	KDNP ⁴	3
	Hungarian National Alliance	3
7.	"Greens"	2

¹Hungarian Democratic Forum-Young Democrats Forum.

²Independent Smallholders Party ("Torgyan's Group").

³Hungarian Socialist Workers Party.

⁴Christian Democratic People's Party.

The weakness of the coalition parties comes as no surprise in light of the heavy criticism leveled at the workings of the government. The low-altitude flight of the "free birds" deserves far more attention. According to one of our surveys, two years ago the SZDSZ appeared to our youth as the undisputed, most popular party. By now the SZDSZ is able to attract only as many sympathizers as the MSZMP, the party that represents the fallen system.

At the same time appreciation expressed for extremes could raise concerns. This trend is clearly shown by the increasing popularity of the Hungarian National Alliance, the MSZMP, "Torgyan's Group," and—however odd this may seem—of FIDESZ, (because in the people's view FIDESZ does not appear as a liberal party, but as an extreme populist party, based on the style and statements of its front men).

This question arises: What political program would our youth willingly support, as long as our political parties are this far from making an impact?

At first we inquired about the youths' socio-political value system by asking them to choose and to rank the top five political "slogans" from among 20 presented to them.

The following list of priorities evolved: (See Table 2.)

Table 2

Priority	Concept
1.	National independence
2.	Social security—A decent livelihood for everyone!
3.	God—Country—Family
4.	Order
5.	Fairness
6.	Fixed prices—An end to inflation
7.	Full employment—Right to work
8.	Public safety—Strong, firm police
9.	National unity
10.	Right to own property—Property security
11.	Freedom—Equality—Brotherhood
12.	Holding to account the criminals of the past system
13.	Freedom of religion
14.	Market economy
15.	Constitutional statehood—Equal justice under law
16.	Freedom of speech, freedom of the press

No one chose slogans concerning "civil society," "the right to associate," "the evolution of a broadly based middle class," and "grass roots organizing in society."

This ranking demonstrates that watchwords pertaining to the nation have the greatest impact. In parallel with this, one can sense a firm desire for a strong state power, one that also exercises paternal care over the welfare of its subjects.

In contrast, the "liberal parties," and watchwords conveying concepts of liberty in general, impress only a very negligible number of the future voters.

Answers given to additional questions further confirmed the already evolved picture.

Further inquiries confirmed that 50-70 percent of young people regard the "socialist" economic model as ideal. At the same time, however, it comes as a surprise that they

rather firmly reject the ideology of "socialism," a way of thinking that was mandatory ever since they were in nursery schools; of the 227 students only four were attracted to the ideals of communism, and only 14 to socialist ideals.

One also finds that from among the ideals of the past system "proletarian internationalism" has made the least impact. A large majority of those questioned has strong emotional ties to national legacies: Being part of the Hungarian people is very important to 165 young people (72.7 percent).

The past atheistic propaganda proved to be far more effective: Only about 40 percent of the students practice their religion. But it would be very difficult for anyone to forge political capital out of religious feelings today, because a majority of the students recognizes no personal or societal benefit in either the return of church property or in the introduction of religious education in schools.

The most stunning finding of the survey is that an alarmingly large number of students are opposed to basic principles proclaiming equality among people. Three-fourths (!) the number of students, 168 to be exact, believe that certain groups of people are inferior from the outset by virtue of their birth or origin.

Gypsies would be least favored as neighbors by 177 students; 146 chose Arabs as their least favored potential neighbors. These groups are followed in the order of least preferred neighbors by blacks (28), South-Slavic refugees (21), Jews (16), Hungarians resettled from beyond the borders (14), and Asians (9).

Despite statements to the contrary, the low level of anti-Semitism is noteworthy. The antipathy manifested toward Jews is barely larger than the dislike for Hungarian refugees from Transylvania or from Yugoslavia.

These responses well reflect the confused values I mentioned at the beginning of this writing. But the confusion that exists in the heads of the respondents becomes even more pronounced if we examine the contradictory relationship between the various parties and their followers. It should suffice to take a glance at the table to recognize the large dissonance that exists between the ideologies and practical endeavors of the various parties on the one hand, and their followers, on the other. (See Table 3.)

Table 3

	No. of Sympathizers	Receptiveness to Liberal Watchwords	Market Economy Advocacy	Religiousness	Views Influenced by Racial Prejudice	Strong Linkage to National Ideals
FIDESZ	26	2	8	7	22	23
FKgP	5	—	1	2	5	5
MDF-IDF	8	2	2	4	5	8
MSZP	6	—	—	1	5	5
SZDSZ	4	4	4	—	1	—
KDNP	3	—	—	3	1	3

The "ideological" abyss between the parties and their followers is widest in regard to the young democrats: A "typical" FIDESZ fan cannot be regarded as liberal even with the greatest stretch of imagination.

Aware of what our youth expects from a leader of Hungary, we find that the first "liberal" contender for the prime minister's post would have to perform peculiar tasks.

Having to waive even a 100-day grace period, he would have to implement immediate pay raises and pension increases, as well as a general reduction in prices. He would have to ensure full employment by establishing new industrial and agricultural large plants. He would also have to establish labor camps for Gypsies and forced reprogramming institutes for homosexuals. And if, along with his numerous duties, he would have time to accomplish this, it would be his duty to mount a white horse and to ride to Kolozsvár [Cluj-Napoca], thus remedying the offenses suffered in Trianon.

I do not envy Viktor Orban.

Just what exactly FIDESZ would do with these supporters is highly questionable. One way to get out of this situation would be to perform some intensive public relations work and to scare away this group from itself. The other—more likely—alternative would be for FIDESZ not to resist the lure of power, and to catch all kinds of winds which swell its sails. After all, Mao, one of the teachers of our present day "liberals," said that the color of the cat makes no difference, of importance is that the cat catches the mouse.

The lesson to be learned from the above is that the value system of the future generation is far removed from what has emerged as a result of the system change, and that it is far more conservative than one would expect.

Similar results were produced by a larger survey conducted by Maria Vasarhelyi (MOZGO VILAG No. 6, 1992 pp 38-41). Vasarhelyi was pleased with nostalgic feelings manifested toward the previous system, because these, too, multiply the difficulties faced by the national coalition government. But due to Vasarhelyi's attitude, her evaluation is a bit lopsided, because one would have to be crazy to rejoice over his airplane catching fire just because his mother-in-law is also aboard.

Recent surveys should, indeed, teach some lessons to the government, but the findings should also be pondered by the opposition. While the masses clearly reject the policies of the present government, only a very small proportion of the populace espouses "liberal" endeavors.

A majority of the people—and this is also confirmed by the findings of our survey—would most prefer a kind of politics built on national watchwords and social demagoguery, conveyed by an authentic personality (i.e., a person who has not lost his credibility). The nation is awaiting its Peron, or at least a Meciar today.

Hungarian democracy is fortunate not to have produced a politician "suitable" for this kind of politicking.

While Arpad Goncz (Uncle Arpi) undoubtedly serves as the nation's Santa Claus, his small, shrewd eyes zig-zagging back and forth make him look more like a small predator than a populist leader. Jozsef Antall does not lack the historic commitment akin to that of De Gaulle, but his speeches test one's patience and he is incapable of making irresponsible promises to the nation.

The "media" successfully presented Jozsef Torgyan as a clown; at present it seems that he is doing everything to live up to such expectations.

Viktor Orban, the nation's enfant terrible, is fully authentic, and so are primarily his angry outbursts that raise blood pressure, and his arrogant pride. But due to his jabbering, one never finds out what he really wants to say, and this could even be fortunate.

From among his friends who share his views, only Gabor Demszky is suited to serve as a populist leader, but only because of his outward appearance. It would be odd, to say the least, for the leader of the nation to get sick from Hungarian Culture Day, or from erecting a Szekely gate.

People have adopted a wait-and-see attitude. An increasing number of signs indicate that the present party structure that crystallized along the lines of how the parties relate to national traditions, is hardly responsive to the expectations of a majority of citizens. It is equally clear that the people are in no mood to have a "democracy" in which "regular" elections are held periodically, but in which only positions are changed at the end of each term, where liberals take the places of conservatives, and conservatives of the liberals, while misery and hopelessness if left for the majority.

Are you satisfied with the system change?

	No. of Students	% of Students
Yes	52	22.9
Dissatisfied	175	77.1

Has a system change taken place?

	No. of Students	% of Students
Yes, and it is a positive change	52	22.9
No	59	26.0
Yes, but the previous system was better	116	51.1

Are you satisfied with the government's performance thus far?

	No. of Students	% of Students
Satisfied	6	2.6
Partly satisfied	11	4.8
Dissatisfied	169	74.4

Would you vote if the elections were held today?

	No. of Students	% of Students
Undecided	75	43.1
Certainly not	38	22.1
Certainly would	59	43.3

The preponderance of the state in the economy must be preserved

	No. of Students	% of Students
No opinion	28	12.3
Disagrees	78	34.4
Agrees	121	53.3

Large differences in wealth are improper

	No. of Students	% of Students
Does not know	61	26.9
Disagrees	76	33.5
Agrees	90	39.6

The state has a duty to provide for the welfare of its citizens

	No. of Students	% of Students
No opinion	27	11.9
No	41	18.1
Yes	159	70.0

Certain people are inferior by virtue of their birth or origin

	No. of Students	% of Students
No opinion	15	6.6
Disagrees	44	19.4
Agrees with the statement	168	74.0

Are you religious?

	No. of Students	% of Students
Very much so	25	11.0
Somewhat	72	31.7
Not religious	130	57.3

Do you agree with returning former church property?

	No. of Students	% of Students
No opinion	32	14.1
No	83	36.6
Yes	112	49.3

Do you regard the introduction of religious education as dangerous?

	No. of Students	% of Students
Does not know	12	5.3
Includes certain dangers	66	29.1
Sees no danger in doing so	149	65.6

Nationalist feelings hinder our integration with Europe

	No. of Students	% of Students
Does not know	16	7.0
Agrees	63	27.9
Disagrees	148	65.2

It is the duty of the state to support Hungarians beyond the borders

	No. of Students	% of Students
Does not know	28	12.3
Disagrees	36	15.8
Agrees	163	71.8

Do you regard yourself as a Hungarian?

	No. of Students	% of Students
No	4	1.8
Ashamed of, regrets being a Hungarian	11	4.8
Indifferent from an emotional standpoint	47	20.7
Belonging to the Hungarian nation is very important	165	72.7

Solutions Offered for Gabcikovo Dilemma

93CH0205B Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 4 Dec 92 p 15

[Article by Tibor Holczer, president of the founding committee of the Environmental Protection Party: "Statement by the Founding Committee of the Environmental Protection Party; The Bos [Gabcikovo] Trap Can Be Eliminated"]

[Text] Motto: "One can fall off the horse on one side or the other. One can find a compromise between the two evils, or one can be dragged along under the horse's belly. But there is a fourth possibility, as well: To mount the horse and amble along."

The "paper tiger" is complete; the Danube has been diverted. The failure of the policies of parliament, the government, the parties in parliament, and the Danube movements is obvious. To continue them can only lead to senseless conflicts, prolonged, expensive, and fruitless lawsuits, and irreversible damage to the environment. The current local measures to avert a catastrophe will not provide even temporary improvement. The experts of the European Community undertook the role of mediator only, and the propositions of the Slovakian party—to carry out either the plan according to the agreement, or the C variant—are unacceptable from an environmental point of view. It will take years for the International Court at The Hague to determine who violated a law and in which way. It will not make suggestions to solve the problem; at the most, it will compel the Slovak party to demolish the dam at Dunacsuny [Cunovo].

In Resolution No. 26/1991, the National Assembly compelled the government to abrogate the 1977 treaty and conclude a new treaty. Of these, the unilateral abrogation

of the treaty was realized, but neither the government organs, nor the parties in parliament, nor the Danube movements brought forward suggestions that are acceptable from an environmental point of view, and on the basis of which a new treaty could be concluded, or which could at least be regarded as a basis for negotiations. The reason for this could be, among other things, that because of the natural features of the region in question, traditional concepts for the construction of hydroelectric power plants and traditional types of such plants cannot be realized here, and one cannot arrive at some sort of technological compromise to the detriment of ecological criteria.

We would like to point out that the proposal that demands the complete abandonment of the power plants, the dismantling of the completed structures, and the restoration of the "original" conditions, and which intends to ensure a satisfactory navigational route using the methods of traditional river control, is unacceptable from the point of view of both ecology and economy. Dredging shallow reaches of the river and constructing diversion dams will only accelerate the erosion of the riverbed, which is taking place at an increased speed already, and which will cause the Danube's bed to sink, and consequently the level of both the Danube itself and the water table to such an extent that the forests in the wetlands of Szigetkoz [region at the Danube in northern Hungary] will slowly but surely dry out. If the completed structures are dismantled, not a penny of the billions invested in them will be recovered, and we would a priori give up the utilization of the Danube's renewable energy. The realization of the proposal is impossible anyway for political reasons.

We are convinced that by assuming a constructive attitude striving for an agreement and by accepting the priority of ecological criteria, the current trap can be eliminated. This would be highly necessary anyway, because if the present situation is maintained, irreversible damages will occur to the flora and fauna of Szigetkoz.

For this reason, we propose the realization of an ecological solution, the essence of which is as follows:

1. An environment-friendly hydroelectric power plant should be built at Bos, possessing the following features:

a. No reservoir will be built on the Danube, and the water will not be dammed up permanently anywhere in the wetlands. As a result, there will be no permanent high water anywhere, and conditions of slow flow or stagnant water cannot develop. Floating silt will not be deposited at an increased rate, and polluted sludge will not be pressed into the subsoil. Incidentally, these are phenomena which pollute drinking water.

b. At river kilometer 1868.1, under Pozsony [Bratislava], a new artificial branch of the Danube will be created, which will gradually rise above ground level, and across Dunacsuny join the headwater canal, which has already been extended up to that point. No dam will be built on the Danube at the branching point, and thus, the quantity of the water in the branch (which is actually the headwater canal) and in the old Danube, respectively, will be determined by the prevailing water level of the old Danube, or

rather, the natural water level measured at the branching point. Thus, the quantity of the water in the headwater canal can be reduced to as little as 0 cubic meter per second by turning off the turbines at Bos, but it could not be significantly increased by regulating the Bos power plant!

c. The hydroelectric power plant will not be operating at peak output or conveyor belt mode, but rather in a production mode conforming to the rate of flow; thus, the quantity of the electricity produced will not be determined by consumer demand, but rather by the natural flow of the Danube. During extremely low water level, power production will temporarily cease, and a stagnating water level will develop in the operating canal.

d. Navigation can take place all the year round on the operating canal, that is, on the headwater and tailwater canals, at any water level, but the old Danube will also remain an international waterway which will remain navigable in the seasons in which it has been navigable up to now. Thus, the nature of the border will not change; the only change will be that two alternative waterways will be at the disposal of international navigation. (Sluice gates can break down, as the evidence of the past weeks shows!)

e. We will put the dam at Dunakiliti in operation, but it will operate completely independently of both the navigation canal and the Bos power plant. It will not dam up the water permanently; rather, it will only regulate the level of the water and the water table, and move the water on the reaches of the river in Szigetkoz. With its help, Szigetkoz and Csallóköz [Ostrov] can be irrigated "from below" in times of drought. The water can be kept back temporarily behind the dam and under the dam. By letting the banked up water down, one can create a flood of such a magnitude that the level of the water table in the vicinity of the river will rise and soak the soil above the gravel layer, from which plants can soak up the water. With this new method, which has not yet been used elsewhere, large areas can be irrigated inexpensively. Moreover, the dam can also serve as a highway bridge that can considerably shorten the way to Dunakiliti and the Szigetkoz for the inhabitants of Doborgaz, Vajka [Vojka nad Dunajom], and Kisbodak.

Editorial on Anti-Goncz Affair, FKGP Scandals

93CH0213B Budapest HETI KIS UJSAG in Hungarian
27 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Tivadar Partay: "Parties: New Ones, Old Ones..."]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] In the ancient world, a defeated nation was kept in slavery by the victors. And any person of that nation who excelled—be it in jousting, in science, in loyalty, or in any other virtue—was freed. And he lived his life undisturbed as a free man. The base but trouble-free life was left to the servant who entrusted his master to take care of his everyday problems. He was at the bottom of the totem pole, but his lifestyle was far from the bottom! He was property like any other object. In the

Middle Ages, in the age of hired assassins—which is often called dark, although it was in many respects not as dark as the present age—one could know who belonged to the underworld and no one thought of confusing them with politicians. No one thought of dressing him up in various clothes or to send all of them with some spurious emblems to the Forum to loudly shout that this was invented by political opponents in order to create confusion. The hired assassin was an assassin who assassinated the opponent for money. And, although it was never uncovered, everyone knew who hired him. The professional mercenary generals who fought here one day and there the other day with their troops did not want to appear to be statesmen or law-makers; they were simply professional fighters for hire who did not put on hoods or hide under disguises! They fought for money, and were ready to even die for the pay.

As the newer age progressed, it became increasingly vile and merciless, employing increasingly indecent means in an increasingly shameless manner. What other words can I use when the same representative who already sat in parliament at the time when, on 15 March, his party comrades, the members of the Workers Guard, and the police almost beat to death those youths who were wearing rosettes and who were also beaten (as part of an exercise) by members of the communist youth organization—who by now may have grown to become skinheads—now demands a committee investigation because two dozen youths (it is not proven that they were shouting) interfered with the president. What is this if not shamelessness? Why did this Mr. Representative not say a single word after that 15 March? Why did the media, which is so courageous today, not write about it, why did Hungarian TV not film it? And if they did, where was it aired, why was Hungarian Radio silent?

There are innumerable why's. And it was not during the savage Rakosi or the Kadar regime when this happened either! It happened not too far in the past for me not to speak about the hushed-up times of much greater atrocities. Did *pufajkas* [reference to quilted Red Army jackets, symbol of subservience to Moscow] Mr. Representative say a single word of objection when his comrades crippled hundreds of people by beatings? (I will list a few of them on request, among them President Istvan Dobi's leftist friend whose back was broken.) What shamelessness it is for them to now cry for a committee investigation! Was anyone hurt on the square? Even the president's prestige was not hurt there—it was hurt much before then.

Together with the many millions of my fellow TV viewers, I too saw many thousands of people shouting on the square! And who were they? Mostly members of POFOSZ [National Association of Former Political Prisoners] who had cheered when one of their former fellow prisoners ascended to a high post. Not because he had been the one who had suffered the most but because his occupancy of that post was seen by them as a vindication for themselves, their past, and their patriotism for which they had made an enormous sacrifice. Alas, they were disappointed! More than bitterly disappointed! And it was that disappointment what they now voiced.

Let us speak frankly at last! This was to be expected months before (I wrote about it several times!), and those who were helping in the background (for what should the sober-minded reader think—that, by chance, there was not a single member of the opposition present in the vicinity?), those who carry the president every time and everywhere as a standard, those, for instance, who on 15 March surrounded him at the statue and who accompany him everywhere, where were they? And why at a distance? Was it because they knew that something was going to happen?! And now? On the left, an investigation is shriekingly demanded, even by those who try to hush up the affair of the AVH [State Security Authority] thugs, while on the right, the unfortunate Csurka affair is being kept alive by all imaginable means. After Mr. Lantos and Mr. Doros [as published], now the chief rabbi has also appeared; he did not go to Italy where graves and churches are desecrated, he did not go to Germany where the neo-Nazis are demonstrating, he came here instead where altogether six insignias have been spotted on boys who were sent from who knows where and where only 20 hooded persons were seen, not one of whom even once uttered the word Jew. It is here, where the world must be incited against us; here, where no one during the past 40 years was ever berated for being a Jew; here, where no one paints swastikas and where no fascist party exists, etc. Why? Why must a storm, with unimaginable consequences, be created at all costs? They let it go by their ear when Mr. Sz. states that the skinheads exist only to replace Torgyan's abolished Independent Youth. The fact that they were hired by Torgyan was left out even of the brief news report, only the FKgP [Independent Smallholders Party] Youth Organization was repeatedly mentioned. What is this if not a transparent tendency [as published]?

Well, the bravados of long ago were more decent than this because they accepted the title of assassin. And what can we say when a soft-spoken and smart female reporter becomes aware two years later that Representative Dr. Janos Szabo was earlier a court-martial assessor? How come just now? Because it is now that he has become faction leader, so he is suitable for discrediting the party that is put on the rack to begin with. Incidentally, she kept silent about the fact that in 1960 he was a young soldier and worked as an attorney at the court-martial where, by the way, there were many decent people. I myself have known several people who were expelled because they, working as attorneys, were unwilling to judge according to orders. And yet, he gave up his rank after six months and left the military because he did not even want to hear about the things that happened there (through the usual methods of the comrades who stayed). And Dr. Szabo was right: Who is the one who should clear himself, he who was a court-martial assessor for six months or the reporters or journalists who in 1960 and since have been zealously doing things which only cause problems because they are interested in nothing else?

This is a strange and disgusting thing. As soon as an FKgP leader assumes an office, the digging up of his past begins. But no one asks Mr. So-and-so what he wrote or what he reported on as a comrade. Or possibly where he came

from. Or who called and brought him here. Even though there is hardly any leader on that side who in 1960, or even before, was a member of Mary's Congregation. But this is no problem; Today's mercenaries—who are now called journalists, reporters, program directors, etc.—must, for their own benefit, keep quiet about this. [passage omitted]

What about the parties? It would take a man on his feet to figure them out. They themselves cannot! Male and female members of parliament take a seat here and there without even thinking about the fact that they were elected on the basis of an announced program or an ideal that they cannot drag after themselves into another row of benches like a dog drags a doormat. There are some who have changed benches two, if not three, times. The question arises, the ideal of which seat or the banner of which bench do they honestly represent? The first one, the second one, the umpteenth one? None of them! They are driven not by principles, not by ideals, but exclusively by money! And perhaps by the prospects of the near future. The voter is absolutely perplexed by this confusion.

Yesterday I received three telephone calls, two letters, and two visitors. All of them asked the question, who is to be meeting at MOM [Hungarian Optical Works] on the 21st of the month. For they decided a few weeks ago that the FKGP's Historical Section would meet there, but now they have received an invitation signed by Bela Nemeth who is not even a member of this section! And they do not want to go to his meeting. They have their reasons, I did not ask. But I was unable to provide an answer. Whom does Bela Nemeth represent? I do not know, perhaps the flower producers or something similar. Not the FKGP because—justifiably or not—the court forbade that. Not the faction because he is not a representative, and not the Historical Section because he is not a member. Whom then? Ask me something easier, I said. The next question concerned Representative Sandor Olah openly declaring (not for the first time) that he is a liberal. How can he then hold a press conference, regarding his own actions in terms of ethics, which is in itself unethical, and the future of the FKGP (which he continually spurns)? If there is a trace of his earlier character left, he can only leave the FKGP. I could not—i.e., did not want to—answer this either. After all, Sandor Olah used to be my friend, and now I did not ask what is ethical and what borders on ill will.

But let us see! A local "party leader," a temporary leader (as he is called by the HOLNAP, his own paper), came for a visit from the United States. He appeared at the meeting of his Hungarian brother (Peterfy Street) and started an argument there about how the money he has given was spent. Then he dashed out and formed party alliances with Mr. Torgyan and Mr. Boross. (Sandor Olah was left out of this, too, although this was the reason why he was brought before the Ethics Committee.) Do you understand this at all? A "party leader" from the United States without his party. Had there been one, he would form an alliance with the Hungarian Le Pen (although Dr. T. denies this, and perhaps he is right. In Paris, he did not succeed in meeting with Le Pen). Invitations were sent out by this person who belongs nowhere, who does not want to acknowledge that

he has been knocked out of the political ring, and who has renounced his party and formed a party alliance with the Hungarian party! Is it possible to understand this? It is like a fight over a bone!

Can any one of them embark on new and clean paths this way?

Do they not need a new and still innocent congregation?

Internal Power Relations of MDF Analyzed

93CH0203A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 5 Dec 92 pp 79-80

[Article by Florian Mezes: "MDF Debates Part I; The Party's Favorite"]

[Text] *The debate aroused by the ill-famed Csurka essay in August even within the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] and rehashed in the past week or two was successfully bottled up again. The "meeting of presidents" at the end of last week spoke out in support of party unity. Obviously, aspirations to power in the party or in the government are operating under the surface. In the following article we will try to delineate the parameters of these processes of party and greater politics. Part one will deal with power relations within the party.*

It is possible that interested people outside the party will not learn before January, that is to say, before the next national convention of the MDF, what position the leading organs of the MDF took in the debate of the two "party lines" hallmarked by Istvan Csurka and the national liberals, respectively. The September resolution and assessment by the party leadership started out in principle as a position paper in which the Csurka essay which was launched in the heat of August and which has since become an MDF watershed was basically called a very good little paper. The speech by Jozsef Antall in parliament in which the party president prime minister distanced himself from some statements in the essay, but otherwise considered the discussion on the media more important, since he allotted much more time to them in his speech (HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, 5 September 1992), could have been taken as a standpoint. However, the dispute that has since heated up within the elite of the MDF made the truthfulness of these statements doubtful; as it turned out, they only served the purpose of demonstrating the political unity of the largest coalition party.

It was again the party president who sounded the keynote when at the forum of MDF liberals (HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, 21 November 1992) he censured "some statements" of the Csurka essay much stronger than before, but at the same time "dealt a blow" to more vehement liberal Csurka-opponents, as well. In other words, beside the classic two-front struggle he established an internal dual front, as well, with the difference that this time it is directed primarily against the left, and only secondarily against the right. Pointing to himself as a center of spiritual and political gravity between the internal fronts, he basically called on disputing party devotees to gravitate towards the political center, i.e., to him, while preserving their ideological identity.

After this, for a few moments it seemed that this cannot take place without some degree of disqualification of Istvan Csurka. Two weeks ago MAGYAR HIRLAP, quoting an unnamed informer, wrote that at the meeting of the MDF leadership every member of the party with one exception urged Istvan Csurka to resign as vice president of the party. The fact itself was not credibly contradicted by anyone; Istvan Csurka himself only said that he was not urged, only asked to leave. Parliamentary representative Istvan Bethlen and Gabor Szeles, president of the National Alliance of Manufacturers, both members of the MDF presidium, also confirmed fairly unequivocally that the presidium took a stand against Csurka.

The counterattack came from the "Lakitelek side": Sandor Lezsak called the news circulated about the meeting of the presidium "base lies." And it seems that this will ultimately be the official keynote of the MDF. Not only because one or another member of the presidium recanted—for instance, Gyorgy Szabad, speaker of parliament, member of the party presidium, first only "did not wish to reveal" whether it was true that he wanted to resign from the presidium if Csurka remained, but at the end of last week he called the same "the usual scuttlebutt"—but also primarily because last Wednesday's meeting of the MDF presidium only decided that a committee should be created by Wednesday of this week. According to statements, the committee was entitled to make proposals to solve "the matter"; thus, its task will not be the evaluation of the Csurka essay and the related (counter)essays.

This basically determined what could be expected from the conference of the presidents of local MDF organizations at the end of last week. Information about the meeting, which was closed to journalists—at which 459 of the 850 presidents of local organizations were present, could be obtained at a press conference; according to the press conference, the attending presidents unanimously stood by Jozsef Antall and the unity of the MDF, and did not take a position against anyone (any opinion, any essay), except, of course, the political left and the press. Which, if it is really true, can hardly be interpreted in any other way than that there will be no Csurka affair until a proposal is drawn up with the help of Jozsef Antall, who apparently still enjoys absolute respect, about how the MDF should relate to the political scandal stirred up by the writer.

The proven method of declaring forums and conferences closed comes in very handy at times like this. For instance, the presidium of the party declared the meetings where members are nominated to the committee and presidium to be elected in January as secret or closed. "The secrecy is understandable," said Imre Furmann, a sort of organizational deputy party president, "so that no candidate could be made a favorite." Which means that the presidium wanted to preclude undesirable premature electioneering, and ultimately perhaps a manifestation of the ideological-political war of essays and statements in the contest of candidates way before the national convention, which could perhaps lead to a (premature?) split of the party. At the same time, the secrecy makes it impossible to determine whether "statistically" the party groups are making a

choice between the two major "sides" of the current internal discussion of the MDF, and if so, what kind of a choice.

So far it is not even known whether the nomination meetings are over everywhere. Namely, in the peculiar system of nominations adopted at the last national convention, it is not enough if a membership organization makes its proposal. If a member is nominated to the committee outside his local organization, the latter must meet again to determine whether it also supports the nomination. It is this subsequent endorsement which finally validates the lists of candidates; thus, according to the MDF headquarters, a summary of the names of candidates and the number of times they were nominated can be expected at the earliest in the middle of December (the final list of candidates will include those who were nominated by at least 5 percent of the membership).

At any rate, it cannot be accurately determined whether the Csurka camp is really as large among MDF members as it appears from the mass of people participating in the (general) assemblies organized by the writer-politician. For instance, one of the prominent national liberals, deputy party president Imre Furmann, termed the view voiced several times by his liberal colleague Jozsef Debreczeni that three-fourths of the membership supported Istvan Csurka a misunderstanding. According to the deputy president of the MDF, this only applies to the active membership, the "core" of the party; in his estimation, to 5,000-6,000 of the 27,550 members. He includes here the functionaries of the party, representatives to self-governments, members of various advisory bodies of the party, or those who can be "mobilized," who regularly participate in (party) functions, and who organize them. "We don't have statistical data on the active membership," Imre Furmann told us, "but in our experience they are older than the MDF average; they are primarily active retirees." Which can partially explain why they seem to be more receptive to the (national) feelings rather than thoughts represented by Istvan Csurka—especially the "danger from the left," justice, the inconsistencies of compensation and privatization—which can be stirred up with their passionate help (and which Istvan Csurka is apparently able to stir up. From the general composition of membership (HETI VILAGGAZDASAG, 8 December 1990) it is also apparent that the majority of MDF members, who are 30 to 60 years old, relatively educated, and who attained higher positions at work in the "accursed regime," can hardly accept en masse, for instance, the Csurka-vision of an unlimited preservation of power of people who were in powerful position in the previous regime.

Istvan Csurka can definitely rely on one thing: the dissatisfaction with the government, which is indisputable even within his party. This is where he can find "allies" not only among party members—and nonmembers—who are on the way to becoming poor or are already poor, but also within the MDF elite; it is enough to refer to the pertinent thoughts even of national liberals who denounce Csurkaesque views in their statements. The writer-politician

must sense this, because it cannot be by accident that he retorted to Jozsef Antall that if Antall has to explain himself abroad because of the Csurka-essay, then he, Csurka, has to explain himself constantly at home because of the government. Which actually means nothing else than that he feels enough force and support behind him to attack the MDF idol, and indirectly the unity of the party. Not the unity of the party per se, but the one hallmarked by Antall.

Local MDF Organization in Bekescsaba Splits

93CH0203B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian
28 Nov 92 p 4

[MTI report: "MDF Splits in Bekescsaba"]

[Text] In a statement issued yesterday, the self-government college of the Bekescsaba organization of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] announced that until the January national convention, i.e., the clarification of the party's internal relations, its members wish to work as members of the Bekescsaba organization, but separate from it, exclusively within the framework of the self-government college. The separation occurred because of the situation created after the Wednesday meeting of the local MDF organization. The statement declares: After the resignation of Laszlo Galfi (actor, winner of the Jaszai award) and the ensuing election of the new president and vice president, the personal prerequisites for the possibility of cooperation between factions within the party ceased. The majority belonging to the populist-national circle pushed the representatives of the self-government college, who accept differences, promote tolerance, and are differently minded, out of the leading bodies of the party. In the college's opinion, the coerced personal composition of the presidium does not correspond to the proportions of the respective value systems which exist within the organization.

One of the members of the group which made the statement, deputy mayor Gyorgy Molnar, said that the group consists of 15-20 members (including the entire self-government faction of the MDF with one or two exceptions), and that the self-government college which accepts the values of all three factions within the MDF is regularly defeated by the 25-30 active populist-nationalist MDF members. The Bekescsaba MDF organization has approximately 80 members. In the opinion of the members of the self-government college, the majority does not participate in the life of the party because the populist-nationalist circle alienates them. If the centrist policy of Jozsef Antall prevails at the January national convention, they will remain in the MDF; if not, everyone will decide for himself which party he will join, the deputy mayor said.

In the opinion of Attila Kerekes, president of the Bekescsaba organization of the MDF, the content of the statement by the self-government college is not true, with the exception of the time of the membership meeting. They have been operating with the utmost respect to democracy and the principles of the MDF, and will continue to do so. The Bekescsaba MDF organization nominates Jozsef Antall for party president, and at the last membership

meeting a party member was elected into the five-member presidium whose thinking is close to that of the liberals.

Deputies Comment on Reduction in Defense Budget

93CH0212A Budapest MAGYAR HONVED in Hungarian
No 50, 11 Dec 92 p 4

[Interview with Lajos Horvath and Andras Nagy, members of parliament's Defense Committee, by Cs.H. and A.K.; date and place not given: "How Much Is the Forint Worth When It Is Used for Defense?"]

[Text] *At the end of November, the parliament approved Hungary's budget for next year, and thus it was at last decided how much the defense portfolio will get. The lawmakers had a rather lengthy debate—both in the Defense Committee and the plenary session—on the amount of money available for defense. We questioned Lajos Horvath (MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum]) and Andras Nagy (SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats]) on this subject.*

[MAGYAR HONVED] On the basis of the parliamentary decision that is now known, the defense budget falls 2 billion forints short of the preliminary plan. One billion of this was "lifted" from money slotted for the army hospital's renovation. What are the justifications for this decision?

[Nagy] I had doubts about this matter during the course of our committee investigation in connection with the renovation. I even voiced my opinion. The Defense Committee discussed the issue of the army hospital and determined that there is no prospect of continuing or finishing this investment project. So, our committee had no choice but to decide not to endorse the use of the hospital's budget, even if that would be warranted by the national budget. To date the Hungarian state has invested 7 billion forints in this project, and it is not at all certain that the construction can soon be finished. I think that we do have a solution in our hands: We should make a resolution to finish this project with the possible use of foreign capital. I would like to note that there is precedence in Hungary for such a solution.

[Horvath] It must be said that the army hospital's problem is not an internal affair of the army, for it would not be used solely by the army. The army is unable to finance such a gigantic project at a time when the defense budget is insufficient even for acquiring the fundamental military technology and for social development.

[Nagy] I would like to add that, even before, the army hospital project was financed not with the army's budget but rather with the budget for special projects. Of course, the army's budget is also burdened by any institution in which army employees work.

[Horvath] The army's basic task would be to operate field hospitals; otherwise, the issue of hospitals should fall under the social welfare portfolio's authority.

[MAGYAR HONVED] What is your opinion on the 1993 state budget and, within that, the defense budget?

[Nagy] My opinion on this basically corresponds with that of my party. We think that a considerable portion of next year's budget deficit could be avoided if the various portfolios would not strive to increase their staff and to set up new offices. But, with regard to the army's budget in concrete terms, my opinion is quite different from that of my party. I think that it is entirely inappropriate to try to decrease the army's budget at all costs. Of course, I agree that internal restructurings should take place. All in all, however, I think that the amount allotted for the defense portfolio is insufficient. On the other hand, I am not sure that it was necessary to double the staff of the Defense Ministry, nor do I think that the extensive replacement of its car pool was justified. At any rate, the amount allotted for the army is insufficient for setting up and operating an effective Hungarian army.

[Horvath] This budget is a strict budget of a country that is in a dire situation. I say as criticism that the ministry does not define those special areas that would be especially important to develop. I very much regret that the defense budget is among these areas. In view of the events in the region, we should pay more attention to the army.

[MAGYAR HONVED] At the meetings of the Defense Committee, your viewpoints differ in discussing the issues of defense, but you are always trying to arrive at a consensus, one could say, in a nonpartisan way. What are your evaluations of the Defense Committee's work.

[Horvath] Over-emphasizing party interests has indeed been eliminated in the Defense Committee—if anywhere—and our primary effort is to arrive at a consensus. But, frankly, the committee is not functioning as well as it could. The main reason for this is that, unfortunately, some of our colleagues are unable to attend every meeting. The chairman's team, too, is not as efficient as it should be. Be that as it may, the Defense Committee is doing a good job but, of course, we still have great reserves.

[Nagy] The Defense Committee is one of those parliamentary committees in which relatively few comments are made that expressly serve party interests. Ours is perhaps one of parliament's most efficient committees. We must meet almost weekly. But, as most of our meetings are closed, very few publications about our work appear. I would like to note that the chairman's team could be more helpful in securing press publicity. This is perhaps our greatest shortcoming. In summary, I think that our committee is doing a very good job; it is, of course, another matter that its work is not much publicized and that few people are aware of our activity.

Dismantling of Weapon Systems in Godollo

93CH0212B Budapest MAGYAR HONVED
in Hungarian No 50, 11 Dec 92 pp 12-13

[Article by B.Sz.N.: "HK.-Ko."]

[Text] In accordance with the Vienna Accords, which regulate the Reduction of European Conventional Weapons and Weaponry, Godollo Machine Factory on 24 November began destroying tanks and combat vehicles

specified in the accords. Eight new states signed an agreement at the Vienna Arms Reduction Talks on the territories of the 16 member states of NATO and the five member states of the former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union, that each of the two military powers may have 20,000 tanks. In addition, a reduction of other combat equipment is also included in the agreement that was signed on 19 November 1990 in Helsinki and that went into effect on 17 June 1991. During the first 120 days of the 40-month agreement, the countries verified through mutual exchange of data that the participating countries indeed have the reported quantity and quality of weapons. This is the first agreement on conventional weapons in Europe which, after its implementation, will significantly contribute to greater stability and security in our region. The agreement limits, on national levels, the number of personnel and main weapons of the participating states. Five main types of weapons are included: tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery over 100 mm, combat helicopters, and airplanes. During the reduction period that will follow the 120-day verification, each participating state will be obliged to decrease its own equipment at a predetermined schedule through one of the methods specified in the agreement.

Lieutenant Colonel Domokos Kabai, an expert on defense policy, said in reply to our question that by the end of the three-year reduction period the Hungarian Army will have to reduce the number of its tanks by more than 500, to 835. Mainly T-34, T-54, and T-55 tanks will be destroyed. Of course, the objective of each country is to take out of service, first of all, the less modern technologies and only then, if necessary, the more modern weapons. It is not accidental that Hungary, too, will begin terminating the earlier tank models, armored transport combat vehicles, and other artillery guns rather than the recently purchased supermodern 152-mm self-propelling howitzers or the T-72 tanks. The essence of the various methods of reduction is that, following the operations, a given weapon system should not remain suitable for its previous purpose. Of course, the Hungarian Army, too, will try other ways of salvaging the weapons slotted for elimination, namely, by removing usable parts from the combat vehicles (engines, drive trains, electric equipment, etc.) and offering them for sale. There have been negotiations about the use of armored combat vehicles in agriculture but, as it turned out, because of their complicated operation and high fuel consumption, these clumsy machines are uneconomical for farming and thus cannot be used for that purpose. Thus, aside from the little combat equipment that will be used for museum exhibitions, those tanks and combat vehicles that are affected by the arms reduction will be smelted down for use by the steel industry.

Of course, the dismantling of weapons designated for reduction has already begun in several participating countries, monitored by international groups of inspectors. The Spanish Weapons Control Center—the officers of which participated on Tuesday in Godollo Machine Factory in the disassembly of the first tanks—is responsible for the international monitoring.

* * *

The briefing on the method and process of destruction, in which a group of nine inspectors also participated, began at 0900 hours in Godollo. Subsequently, French, British, Danish, German, U.S., and Spanish officers were able to witness in one of Godollo Machine Factory's assembly yards the destruction (by being cut into pieces) of the first 14 T-34's of Hungarian Army tanks, the number of which must be reduced. The inspectors did not come solely to look around: They climbed into the rusty and oily tanks, made measurements, compared figures, and wrote down data. The tanks were cut in half and then, following the dismantling of parts and internal equipment, the assembly workers cut the tubes and frames into several pieces with cutting torches. After that, the huge pieces of armor were transported to a steel mill, and the old tanks end their lives in furnaces.

School Reprivatization 'Secret Contract' Denied

93CH0205A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 5 Dec 92 p 4

[Article by Imola Medve: "Secret (?) Executive Decree (?); FIDESZ on Debrecen Teachers Training College"]

[Text] The topic of the press conference held by the education cabinet of FIDESZ [Association of Young Democrats] yesterday: a secret executive decree concerning the Debrecen Teachers Training College. The press conference was held by Gabor Fodor, member of parliament, leader of the education cabinet of FIDESZ, Lajos Kosa, member of parliament, Janos Mazsu, member of the FIDESZ education cabinet, deputy mayor of Debrecen, and Geza Saska, member of the cabinet, president of the Budapest education committee.

Gabor Fodor said: The Calvinist Church laid claim to the building of the now secular Debrecen Teachers Training College, which used to be a Calvinist high school, and according to a secret contract, the government intends to return the building to them. This in itself would not be a problem, the representative emphasized, but the manner of implementation infringes on the norms of legality. To begin with, the second page of the "executive decree" (the xerox copy of which was distributed to journalists) begins, while half of the first page is left blank; thus, "it can be assumed that something will be written there later." Second: The students, faculty, and administration of the college were not asked whether they wanted their school to be turned into a Calvinist religious college. Third: If this can happen just like that in Debrecen, then other institutions can also find themselves in a similar situation. After these words, Gabor Fodor left and Lajos Kosa who took over the microphone said: The case in Debrecen is a classic example of how one can put everyone concerned in a difficult situation when it would be entirely possible to make a good move, as well.

From Janos Mazsu we learned, among other things, that the building of the Debrecen Teachers Training College is a "cuckoo" among church institutions in the sense that the state did not take it over in the course of nationalization,

but rather bought it later in the course of some sort of nebulous deal; thus, it cannot be returned to the church on the basis of Order No. 32 regulating the reclamation of church property, but rather, "as they were surprised to find, on the basis of a secret executive decree." Even though the self-government offered its active participation and expressed its willingness to make a sacrifice in order to arrive at solution which is both legally sound and satisfying to the public of Debrecen. Namely, that there be a separate state and a Calvinist teachers training college in Debrecen. The city is willing to provide land and a building, a former Soviet barracks, and the college could function in cooperation with the University of Debrecen.

Three times I asked Janos Mazsu what was keeping the city from creating the prerequisites for a secular teachers training college in the current situation which developed as it was described above, with the city's active participation and sacrifice, but I received no answer.

Several of us asked what the guarantee was that the xeroxed page was really an executive decree, and a secret one to boot. Geza Saska said: our word.

To my knowledge, executive decrees beginning with the number 3,000 are published; about the ones beginning with the number 1,000, only the concerned parties are notified, but that does not make them secret. On the xerox copy we received at the press conference, the identification number, file number, etc. was covered, thus, we do not know what the number is and how we should regard the document; this is why we used the question marks and quotation marks.

On the other hand, I read the contract, which was also distributed concerning the Ferenc Kolcsey Teachers Training College in Debrecen between the Ministry of Education on behalf of the government, and the Tiszantul [territory east of the Tisza River] diocese of the Calvinist Church. We are only including one passage here: "The Cabinet of the Hungarian Republic and the presidency of the Council of the Calvinist Church agreed on 19 March 1990 in Budapest that the agreement between the Government of the Hungarian Republic and the Council of the Calvinist Church concluded on 7 October 1948 will be terminated. The government obliges itself to encourage that in the matter of the Calvinist high schools and boarding schools the situation before 7 October 1948 be restored as soon as possible."

I repeat the date: 9 March 1990.

Which government concluded the agreement?

As it is well known, the Antall government took over the agreements concluded by the Nemeth government. Not only the one mentioned above. And not even in secret. And it is carrying them out.

So much about the secret executive decree disclosed with youthful vitality....

Hungary's AIDS Statistics 'Very Favorable'

93CH0189A Budapest KOZTARSASAG in Hungarian
27 Nov 92 p 17

[Unattributed article: "The Hungarian Situation Is Still Favorable"]

[Text] "Do not induce a prompt catastrophic atmosphere; there is no AIDS explosion in Hungary; we still belong to the lightly affected European countries." This fact was brought to my attention initially by Dr. Adam Vass, the AIDS expert of the Department of Welfare and president of the Hungarian AIDS committee. Even the director of the venereal and skin diseases hospital, Dr. Attila Horvath, confirmed that this is not merely official optimism. He indicated that the Hungarian AIDS situation is still very favorable, in spite of the fact that we have become Europe's main crossroad.

According to international experience, for every HIV-infected person that is discovered, there is an average of 10 unknown people who are exposed to the virus. In Hungary, as a consequence of the mandatory screening test, this ratio is more favorable. We know of 316 HIV-virus infected individuals so far, and out of these 110 actually have the disease. Based on laboratory tests, their immune systems are so damaged that they will easily contract diseases that normally represent no problem for the healthy part of the population. One characteristic typical of Hungary's domestic situation is that the majority of the declared AIDS victims originates from the already known HIV infected persons. As of now we know of only one or two cases where someone became ill outside this "circle." It is interesting to note that even the penitentiary institutions were screened and, out of 40,000 medical examinations performed, only two individuals proved to be HIV-positive. Although inside these institutions the population is far more endangered, this data clearly indicates that there is no serious problem present at the moment. It seems also obvious that in Hungary the ratio between disclosed and undisclosed who are infected with the virus is fewer than 10. If this were not true, we would have discovered among the individuals who have AIDS several people who had not been registered as HIV-infected.

Of course, certain aspects of the virus that have been publicized in international papers apply to Hungary as well: The HIV virus infects Hungarians exactly in the same way as it has been infecting 12 million HIV-positive people presently living all over the world.

During the past 10 years, international research has proven that the AIDS virus is present and traceable in certain human secretions, such as blood, semen, vaginal fluid, saliva, spinal marrow, and mother's milk. Nevertheless, hitherto the only proven way it can be contracted is through blood, semen, vaginal secretions, and mother's milk. The most frequent way is through sexual relations, with blood transfusions and blood products holding second place. Nowadays this type of contamination no longer occurs in the developed nations where all blood products are strictly controlled. (In Hungary, since 1986,

there is an obligatory HIV screening for all blood collected or donated through transfusion.)

Naturally, among the intravenous drug users the expansion of the infection through the blood has not been stopped. Quite on the contrary, it appears to be increasing the world over with the collective usage of hypodermic needles and syringes.

The third way for the expansion of AIDS is through the mother-child relationship, since the virus may be transmitted during pregnancy and even after birth during the breast-feeding period. This is an important problem in countries where the HIV-positive female population is high, such as in Africa. Worldwide, HIV-positive women are encouraged not to give birth. In Hungary one HIV-positive woman gave birth twice; however, the children were not infected.

In the African nations experts have suggested that the HIV-positive mothers should not stop breast feeding their babies, as this represents a lesser hazard than the babies starving to death. It is interesting to observe that it has been proven scientifically that the AIDS virus does not expand in the same manner as the rest of the infectious diseases; thus, neither by hand shaking nor by toys, eating utensils, working equipment, or mosquito bites is it possible to get infected. In spite of these proven facts, there are a great number of people who are reluctant to come into contact with exposed and/or infected individuals.

Very often, HIV-positive Hungarians or foreigners who moved to Hungary from other places are molested at their schools, day-care centers, or working places. We have no reason to be afraid of this kind of contraction of the disease, since protection against AIDS is a personal responsibility. The prevention possibilities have been well known for many years, namely: safe sex, cautious partner selection, and continuous use of contraceptives.

[Box, p 17]

AIDS-Related Lawsuits

What can a person do if, while receiving medical treatment, he or she gets infected with the AIDS virus? This is not merely a poetic question, since several of these cases have actually occurred in Hungary during the first half of the 1980's. (Blood transfusions ceased being dangerous since blood samples are being screened for the HIV virus.)

The recovery of health (unfortunately?) is not dependent on whether somebody is directly responsible for having acquired the disease or became infected by accident. Nevertheless, the latter ones can count on diminishing their economic disadvantages. According to information received from the Department of Public Welfare, more than 20 HIV-positive individuals have asked for indemnity from the Hungarian Government since they claim they acquired the disease in state-owned institutions.

Even though the department responsible for public affairs did not deny the validity of the claims, it should be noted that at the beginning they were not considering any possible settlement without court proceedings (i.e., lawsuits). This was not merely due to stubbornness, but, since they

were in the presence of a truly new situation, there was not any possible comparison basis to calculate the amounts of compensation. However, after the first lawsuits were completed, the state became more interested in reaching an agreement and, for this reason, the point was reached where there are no court proceedings currently going on.

Based on current health regulations, with or without lawsuits, individuals who otherwise would not have gotten any indemnity have succeeded in receiving either a one-time compensation of between 2 and 5 million forints

and/or monthly compensations of between 5,000 and 10,000 forints. The particular situation of each HIV-infected individual was taken into consideration, such as age (there are some children among the infected ones), in order to agree on a specific amount.

Although it has been less than two years since the first lawsuits began, presently not all of those seeking AIDS indemnification will be receiving any part of the forfeit compensation money.

Virus Expansion Data for Hungary

Year	HIV-Positive			Full-Blown AIDS			Dead		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
1985	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
1986	4	—	4	1	—	1	1	—	1
1987	112	7	119	7	1	8	4	1	5
1988	32	7	39	9	—	9	8	8	8
1989	31	2	33	14	—	14	11	—	11
1990	37	—	37	15	2	17	1	1	2
1991	50	5	55	29	1	30	15	2	17
1992 ¹	24	4	28	29	2	31	14	—	14

¹Mid-year data.

Public 'Ignorance' of Privatization Noted

93EP0101A Warsaw SPOTKANIA in Polish
No 45, 5-11 Nov 92 p 22

Article by Mieczyslaw T. Starkowski: "Stocks and Liquidations: Every Fifth Enterprise Privatized"]

[Text] The just-published "Report on the State of Privatization in Poland" indirectly shows the magnitude of public ignorance about property conversions.

In the matter of privatization, we have been operating in a void for nearly three years. It was only at the beginning of June of this year that the Sejm instructed the government to summarize what had been accomplished in this area. A deadline was set for the end of July; in other words, it was unrealistic at the outset, say experts from the Ministry of Property Conversions [MPW]. Privatization also lies in the hands of voivodes, mayors, and numerous ministers. The departments do not now have a reporting system. All data come from the Central Office of Statistics [GUS], and one can wait several weeks for them. So the work was late by more than a month. The document presented—as incomplete—in mid-October was not accepted by the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers.

"We could not prepare it ourselves, and we were not in a position to assure ourselves of the cooperation of other departments," explains Bozena Czyzkowska, director of MPW's Analysis Department in June and now an adviser to the minister.

First, there was a lack of information on employment, on the financial consequences of the entire process for the state budget, and on a comparative analysis of the financial condition of private companies and state enterprises. And problems with this will continue because GUS does not have complete data, which does not have major significance anyway because, up to now, it has been impossible to establish a comparative methodology. An appendix prepared in September on the financial condition of companies generates even greater reservations.

The report says that, at the end of June, 1,713 firms, or 22.1 percent of state enterprises, had been privatized. Just under two years ago, the state sold stocks in the "first five." In 1991, the government set an ambitious goal for itself—privatizing half of the enterprises in three years. Conversions gathered momentum rapidly, but, in the first half of this year, a setback occurred.

The document confirms how irregular the development of particular regions was during the time of the PRL. Now this has its consequences: Richer parts of the country are doing better and better, while the situation is getting worse in the less developed parts. This also applies to progress in privatization.

Two Methods

The current legal system provides for two basic methods of privatization.

Commercialization of a state enterprise means conversion to an individual partnership of the State Treasury in the

form of a joint-stock company or a limited liability company, whose stocks or shares are later offered to private buyers.

Liquidation of a state enterprise is based on the "sale, conversion to a partnership, or restoration to profitable use of the whole or an organized part of the property of the enterprise." This occurs on the basis of Article 37 of the law of 13 July 1990 on privatization of state enterprises (as far as firms in good financial condition are concerned), or Article 19 of the law of 25 September 1981 on state enterprises (for reasons of a firm's poor financial condition).

Mieczyslaw T. Starkowski: In My Opinion

In general awareness, privatization brings to mind its most refined, spectacular form—conversion of a firm to a joint-stock company, then offering the stock on the market. Thus, many people are convinced that only 16 enterprises in Poland have been privatized. Hence, the estimates that, if the current rate is maintained, we will change the structure of the economy in 500 years. But the majority of enterprises are privatized through liquidation. This unfortunate term is surely one of the calamities of Polish reform. Liquidation, which is simply erasing a firm from the list of state enterprises, brings to the mind of the average person the placing of a bomb at the walls of a factory. Yet, this is a method personnel very often use—for example, by taking on firms through leasing (a specific form of renting).

The first such report should have seen daylight two years ago and every quarter since. Perhaps then it would have been possible by now to work out a method of comparing financial result of enterprises before and after privatization.

The State of Privatization

State enterprises (initial status)	7,735 (100 percent)
State Treasury partnerships	464 (6 percent)
Including sold partnerships (stocks, shares)	36 (0.47 percent)
Enterprises in liquidation	1,249 (16.1 percent)
Including because of bankruptcy	707 (9.1 percent)
Other forms	542 (7.0 percent)

Source: "Report on the State of Privatization in Poland," Warsaw, September 1992

Antimonopoly Actions, Scenarios Discussed

93EP0105A Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish
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[Interview with Anna Fornalczyk, chairperson of the Antimonopoly Office, by Andrzej K. Wroblewski; place and date not given: "Loneliness of the Long-Distance Runners"]

[Text] [Wroblewski] When you assumed this position, there were fewer monopolies in Poland than there are now—the liquor monopoly...

[Fornalczyk] When I became chairperson, the liquor monopoly still existed, and I managed to contribute to its liquidation.

[Wroblewski] Did you also contribute to its resurrection?

[Fornalczyk] Do not mock me. We are for the treasury monopoly, for the so-called excise, but we are not for an organizational monopoly because such a monopoly does not serve the interests of the State Treasury. It does serve the interests of Polish producers, however.

[Wroblewski] Is the resurrection of the liquor monopoly something like changing the traffic rules to left-side driving in order to decrease the number of accidents to the level of Great Britain?

[Fornalczyk] Exactly right. The goal of liquidation of the monopoly was that we wanted more competition among the producers; as a result, we now have a better assortment of vodka. And the reconstruction of the monopoly, especially in the case of the tobacco monopoly, will work the opposite way. It is intended, among other things, so that the amount of the turnover tax would be lower as the usage of Polish tobacco in cigarette production increases. I do not need to explain that the tobacco is lower quality, but it is local and that is what counts!

[Wroblewski] Your arguments sounds assuring. If they did not prevail, is it because other arguments were better, or louder?

[Fornalczyk] The arguments of the Ministry of Agriculture were much louder. But this case is still to be resolved. The Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers will discuss it, and then the government. Who will win, we shall see.

[Wroblewski] And how is it usually? What decides, the power of an argument or the argument of power—that is, power of influence, position, and quantity.

[Fornalczyk] I have the impression that more often merit prevails, but there are other reasons. When there is a need to mend a hole or to quiet moods in society, our arguments do not count. We are the long-distance runners.

[Wroblewski] For example?

[Fornalczyk] For a year and a half we have been beating the drum for demonopolization of the fuel market. Finally, the exact solution we proposed has been accepted; I think gas station customers will feel the difference in the near future.

[Wroblewski] And an example from shorter distances?

[Fornalczyk] Despite our protests, an import tax was introduced. This made the access of foreign products to our market difficult, thus weakening competition. We knew what kind of outcome it would bring, but we had to balance the budget quickly.

[Wroblewski] Balance the budget or make one? Maybe the reason was that, to make a budget, the government needed votes from peasant representatives, and they would like to prevent the import.

[Fornalczyk] Forgive me, but I am not involved in politics.

[Wroblewski] It is not politics; it is arithmetics. One just needs to subtract the votes of the peasant representatives from the government coalition votes and see how many are left.

[Fornalczyk] I am not involved in politics in the sense that I say and write in our official appearances what I think, not what is convenient to say; I hope this will continue. Whether the government will then accept it and the Sejm will approve it is another matter. But I can see with satisfaction that, if I point to some decision made a year or two ago and to its effects, which we predicted, it does convince people and increases our trustworthiness.

[Wroblewski] Not long ago, Balcerowicz said during a speech that, if protectionism exists in Poland, no anti-monopoly control can help.

[Fornalczyk] It is nice to hear it, especially from Balcerowicz. Poland is too small a country to have many, let us say, car factories. Competition must come from foreign countries. Meanwhile, we have to deal right now with a powerful wave of protectionism. Almost every day, there is some meeting or congress of producers, especially those of the food-producing branch. They demand duties, taxes, limits, and, protected by these, they form various cartels that quietly agree on tactics and even on prices.

[Wroblewski] You mentioned the car industry as an example, but most of our industry is shirts, radios, horse-radish, and detergents. Their producers could and should compete among themselves.

[Fornalczyk] That is why we divided up various creations inherited from the past, especially in the agricultural and food-processing industries. But many of the electromechanical, heavy, and extractive industry enterprises cannot be divided, if the balance sheet is taken into consideration. And, if it was not for the convertibility of the zloty, which forced those industries to face foreign competition, they would surely be using their monopoly position.

[Wroblewski] How about the textile industry, which complains so much about competition?

[Fornalczyk] I was even asked by its representatives why the Antimonopoly Bureau has a problem with our efforts to limit the import inasmuch as our industry is not even monopolized! And, at this point, we come into a vicious circle: Enterprises have no money for investments because credits are too expensive; credits are too expensive because the positive interest rate of the credit means that its level is the result of inflation; inflation is a result of price increase by enterprises; and they can raise the prices freely because there is no competition.

Competition will not solve the problem itself through import, but, without competition, we cannot force producers to care about the quality and costs of production as well as about the interests of consumers. If we limit the competition, we will lose the positive changes now somewhat evident in enterprises.

[Wroblewski] Is the existence of lobbies in the Polish economy myth or reality? And, if it is reality, what is the meaning of the power of lobbying?

[Fornalczyk] The answer is that it is a reality I meet almost every day. Its core is mostly the natural monopolies like transportation, energy, and communications. The people from these organizations say that they are the nerve of the economy and one cannot demonopolize the nerve because it is too risky. Conversations with them are difficult because, while we talk about the principles of management, they escape into the sphere of technology, where we, of course, are not equal partners.

[Wroblewski] How about the food-processing industry?

[Fornalczyk] The sugar industry is a classic lobby. To every proposal to expose the industry to market pressure, which would certainly lead to the elimination of bad, insufficient, simply inefficient sugar factories, they reply with catastrophic visions that frighten the members of government and parliament.

[Wroblewski] What do you say to this?

[Fornalczyk] They say one thing, we say another. The discussion has continued for two years. They insist that everywhere in the world the sugar industry is regulated by the state. We say yes, but regulation designates the level of production and does not support weak producers.

[Wroblewski] Are you for euthanasia?

[Fornalczyk] In the economy, definitely yes. For two years, we have been frightened by threats about the wave of gigantic bankruptcies. So far, only a few have failed. Mercifully, we postpone the death of the incurably sick, not caring for the rest. Of course, the fired workers must get social support or be given opportunities of new employment, but for this support and new workplaces, the healthy enterprises must earn money!

[Wroblewski] It is easy to say such things, but, if you had to make such decisions...

[Fornalczyk] But I make such decisions! If we write that an enterprise is supported only by its monopolistic practices, my signature under the decision of forbidding such practices means the death penalty.

[Wroblewski] Is it usually executed?

[Fornalczyk] Well, in the case of the automobile plant, the Antimonopoly Court gave in.

[Wroblewski] There you are!

[Fornalczyk] Now we have a case of a dairy cooperative that used different prices for members and nonmembers.

[Wroblewski] A cooperative is a small group of people. You cannot compare it with the automobile plant.

[Fornalczyk] I can assure you that, if it depended on me, I would shorten the agony of the Lodz cotton industry because it is known that it will not stand the competition.

Let people, energy, and money go to the wool and cloth-making industry because there we have a chance.

[Wroblewski] We wrote not long ago about the decision of the bureau in the case of the Lublin telephones. The customers paid 10 million zlotys each for fast installation, but you ordered that the money be given back to the people.

[Fornalczyk] I read the article, and I consider its tone to be entirely false. It looked as if our bureau harmed the poor customers. Meanwhile, for two years, my bureau has had a bone to pick with the telecommunication department. For two years we have been asking them to calculate the costs—in vain. The firm got huge credits. We know they achieve high profits, and the Lublin branch is forcing the customers to pay additional fees!

[Wroblewski] Do you suspect that it was a pilot action? Today Lublin, tomorrow Torun?

[Fornalczyk] I do not suspect it; I know it! Everywhere the monopolist can take more money from the client, there are social committees and support foundations, according to need—telephone installation, gas pipes, energy lines. We have a special unit in our bureau that monitors the natural monopoly, so we see everything clearly.

[Wroblewski] In your opinion, is the press distributing enterprise RUCH a natural monopoly? One cannot imagine two trucks with newspapers going, let us say, from the same Lodz to the same Kielce.

[Fornalczyk] I always answer that type of question by saying that we do not want the liquidation of monopolies but only that we have no work to do. We do not want complaints about telephones, gas distribution, press distribution, smelly water, and so forth. In Western countries, that somehow works.

[Wroblewski] In Western countries, when the water smells, the city council fires the mayor or the deputies vote out the government. We do not need some office to do that. But press distribution?

[Fornalczyk] As far as I know, every big publisher organizes his own network. Can GAZETA BANKOWA do the same?

[Wroblewski] No.

[Fornalczyk] If not by itself, then together with RZECZPOSPOLITA, and, if that is not enough, with ZYCIE WARSZAWY, too.

[Wroblewski] You said before that Poland cannot afford five automobile plants. Can we afford five distribution networks?

[Fornalczyk] I should ask you this question. Your people should find the answer. Do not wait for the Antimonopoly Bureau to solve all problems for you. Our role is to show what one cannot do. Positive proposals should be the work of specialists from a given sphere, specialists for whom the improvement of the current situation is close to the heart.